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ABSTRACT

This dissertation consists of two essays in which I study the impact of two interdependent consumer behaviors, fairness concerns and exclusivity seeking, on a companys marketing strategies
and profits specifically in a context where it tries to expand its clientele with the objective of generating repeat purchases, for example by running deals on daily deal platforms. In the first essay,
I examine the impact of customers fairness concerns on the profitability of a company running
promotions on daily deal platforms. With the prevalence of social media and the internet, information about such targeted promotions can become available to all consumers including those who
did not have access to the platform and paid a full-price. Conducting a laboratory experiment,
I demonstrate that knowledge about targeted promotions often leads to post-promotional fairness
concerns among these consumers resulting in an increased tendency to switch providers. Incorporating the results of the experiment in a two-period game-theoretic model I analyze the impact
of customers post-promotional fairness concerns on the profits of quality differentiated companies
who compete by running targeted promotions. I find that the low quality provider always suffers
from consumers sensitivity to unfairness. Contrary, I show that the high quality provider can counterintuitively benefit from consumers fairness concerns as long as its quality advantage is not too
large. Furthermore, I analyze how profits are impacted when information about the targeted deals
leaks to non-targeted customers who would have bought at the regular price. I find that, counterintuitively, competing firms profits increase with leakage. In the second essay of this dissertation, I
start with the observation that many platform members are new customers and are uncertain about
the quality of the companys product or service until they consume it. In such a context, I examine
a high quality sellers optimal signaling strategy in a market where consumers prefer to purchase a
scarce product due to desire for exclusivity or to receive a service in a non-crowded environment
due to better experience and service delivery. Utilizing a repeat purchase signaling model I show
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that, consistent with prior literature, the high quality firm signals its quality by making its product
scarce as well as charging a high price when consumers desire for exclusivity is high and cost of
quality is great. Contrary, I also find conditions under which the high quality firm counterintuitively makes its product widely available and prices it low to signal its quality. The model may in
part explain how high quality sellers market their products or services on daily deal websites.
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CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Social Decision Theory implies that consumers make their consumption decisions incorporating
other consumers consumption decisions (Festinger, 1954; Leibenstein 1950; Gaertner 1974). In
other words, the utility that consumers obtain depends not only on their own purchase experiences
but also on other consumers purchase experiences and moreover, on how sensitive they are toward
their comparative social gains and losses (Bernheim, 1994; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Feinberg,
Krishna and Dhar, 2002). Consumers may experience a negative utility when they realize that their
purchase outcome is lower than those of their peer consumers (social loss) or they may experience
a positive utility when they find out they are standing in a better position compared to their peer
consumers (social gain). The mere act of socially interdependent consumption is not a new phenomenon. However, penetration of the social media and other online platforms has magnified the
potential and impact of it. Online platforms have increased consumers ability of sharing and obtaining information about each others consumptive practices and experiences, thereby increasing
the extent of interdependent consumption. Although, there has been much research on interdependent consumer behaviors and their considerable impact on firms profitability (Fehr and Schmidt,
1999; Feinberg, Krishna and Dhar, 2002; Amaldos and Jain, 2005; Balachander and Stock, 2009),
yet more research needs to be done on understanding these behaviors and developing suitable marketing strategies for businesses in different contexts. In this dissertation, I study two interdependent
consumer behaviors, fairness concerns and exclusivity seeking, and investigate their impact on a
firms marketing strategies specifically in a context where firms try to expand their clientele and
generate repeat purchases among them. Recently, many firms try to increase awareness and consequently increase repeat purchases by running promotions on daily deal platforms such as Groupon
and Livingsocial . While some businesses earn higher profits and report higher repeat purchases
than expected, others are disappointed (Dholakia, 2011). In this dissertation, I take a behavior-
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ist approach to explain the impact of interdependent consumption behaviors on profitability and
marketing strategies of firms in such contexts. In the first part of this dissertation, I study the
impact of consumers fairness concerns. While platform members appear happy about the huge
discounts that they receive, non-member consumers who paid the regular price while the promotion was running perceive price unfairness and react negatively to the unfair firm since they realize
the prices they paid are higher from the prices some other customers paid. In a report, Turow,
Feldman, and Meltzer (2005) mention that 76 percent of American consumers would be bothered
if they find out another consumer paid less for the same product that they purchased. Numerous
examples of consumers’ negative reactions to discriminatory coupon targeting can be found on
companies’ customer forums and social networks (BestBuy customer Forum, 2012; Techenclave,
2011). Similarly, academic research in Marketing has shown that ignoring consumers’ price fairness concerns may lead firms to overestimate the profitability of targeted promotions (Feinberg,
Krishna, and Zhang, 2002). Contributing to the fairness concern literature, I investigate the effect
of post-promotional fairness concern on firms pricing strategy and profits in a profit maximization
framework. I develop a two-period game theoretic model where firms that are differentiated in
quality run a promotion in the first (promotional) period. In the second (post-promotional) period,
consumers who have paid the full price receive information about the price discrimination that had
been going on in the promotional period and perceive unfairness. I assume that customers postpromotional product value will be impacted negatively due to their perception of unfairness. First
I, conducted an experiment to provide evidence that such an assumption is valid in a deal platform
setting. The findings of the experiment, contrary to rationality aspect of standard theory of economics, show that consumers take fairness concerns about past firm behavior into consideration
for their future purchase decisions. Incorporating this assumption into an analytical model, I analyze the impact of post-promotional fairness concerns on profitability of targeted promotions on a
daily deal platform. I find that the low quality providers always suffer from consumers sensitivity
to unfairness. Contrary, I show that the high quality providers can counterintuitively benefit from
2

consumers fairness concerns as long as their quality advantage is not too large. These findings
contribute to the understanding of the impact of fairness concerns on a firms strategies and profits
and can, in part, explain why some companies overestimate and others underestimate profits resulting from running promotions on a daily deal platform. In the second essay of this dissertation,
I investigate another issue might be faced by a company promoting its product or service on a daily
deal platform, the fact that many platform members are new customers and are uncertain about the
quality of the companys product or service until they consume it. In such a context, high quality
providers have an incentive to use different marketing strategies to signal their quality to platform
members and generate repeat purchases from them. Stock and Balachander (2005) have shown
that in such an asymmetric information environment, it is more efficient for a high quality provider
to signal their quality by making their product scarce and their intuition is that consumers seek
exclusivity and they perceive what is more exclusive is more valuable. This finding is consistent
with real business cases where early product shortage are mostly observed for new discretionary or
specialty products such as Samsung Galaxy (The Gaurdian, 2013), Microsoft Xbox (CNN 2013),
Microsoft windows 8, etc. products or services. However, observations show that many unknown
restaurants, spas, yoga classes and so on aggressively penetrate the market with the availability
of their product deals on daily deal platforms (Groupon, 2015). The above conflicting examples
(shortage vs. availability) poses the following question: What does possibly explain the reason why
some firms eschew product shortage in favor of product availability and vice versa to signal their
quality in their initial release stages? In the second essay, I extend the purchase context from onetime purchased products to repeatedly purchased ones and I incorporate the impact of consumers
exclusivity seeking behavior to answer the puzzling question above. Consistent with research in
psychology and scarcity literature, I assume that exclusivity seeking (or snobbish) consumers make
their purchase decisions not only on product attributes such as price and quality but also on how
many other consumers in the market could have access to the same product and purchase it (Lynn,
1987; Verhallen and Robben, 1994, Amaldos and Jain, 2005). Following the aforementioned liter3

ature, I model the impacts of product availability/stock-out in a consumer’s utility, such that their
value for a product decreases as the number of people who buy the product increases. Thus, consumers in my model derive utility from three different factors: the product quality, the availability
degree of the product, and its price. I use a two-period signaling model in which a monopoly firm
sells a new repeatedly purchased good to uninformed consumers such as daily deal platforms. In
such a market the low quality provider is willing to signal as a high quality type in the introductory
period. Thus, the high quality firm tends to set his availability/scarcity strategy in the introductory
period in a way to not only maximize his profits but prevent the low quality firm from imitating
his strategy. Interestingly, even in the presence of exclusivity seeking consumers, contrary to the
previous literature, I could identify a set of conditions in which introductory availability is a more
effective signaling strategy than introductory scarcity for a high quality firm. The intuition is that
although making the product available to more consumers in the introductory period negatively
impacts the snobbish consumers’ product valuation and consequently firm’s profits, consumers are
able to infer that only high quality firm is able to compensate for the current loss in future. That is
because a high quality firm attracts more repeat purchases. As more uninformed consumers purchase high quality brand in the first period, more informed consumers may proceed to repurchase
it in the second period. Furthermore, high quality firm’s increasing availability makes mimicry less
attractive for low quality firm, since low quality firms introductory stage profits is reduced and he
will not be able to cover this profits loss with future returns. My findings are consistent with the
business observation that high quality service providers are more willing to making their product
more available on daily deal platforms by providing deep discounts since the initial sales is more
valuable in generating repeat purchases to a high quality firm than a low quality one. Overall,
this dissertation contributes to different streams of research in marketing and economics. First, it
enhances our understanding of the impact of customer behaviors (e.g. fairness concern and exclusivity seeking behaviors) on optimality of firms marketing strategies (e.g. pricing, promotion,
and availability/scarcity) and profits when they tend to induce repeat purchases. Second, it extends
4

the signaling literature by showing the conditions under which availability rather than scarcity is a
more effective signaling strategy for a high quality firm selling an uncertain quality product.
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CHAPTER 2: THE DYNAMIC IMPACT OF PERCEIVED PRICE
UNFAIRNESS ON THE PROFITABILITY OF DAILY DEAL
PROMOTIONS

2.1

Introduction

Recently, many firms try to generate awareness for their product or service among potential customers and to induce trial by running promotions on deal platforms. For example, spas run deals
on Groupon or Livingsocial to attract new customers and to provide them with incentives to try
their services1 . While consumers appear happy about the huge discounts that companies provide
on deal platforms, we often observe in practice that companies have mixed opinions about the performance of such promotions. While some businesses report higher than expected profits others
are disappointed (Dholakia, 2011). The business press and academic research (The Dailybeast,
2012; Gupta et al., 2012; Dholakia, 2011) propose several factors which may negatively impact
firm’s profits from daily deal promotions. For example, they suggest that information leakage
about such promotions may erode profits, i.e. some consumers who were members of the platforms and purchased at the promotional price would have purchased at the regular rate without
using the vouchers. Another concern is that only a small percentage of the customers who redeem
the deal may become regulars after the promotional period is over because they are inherently
price-sensitive. In this research, we focus on analyzing the impact of another factor which may
affect profits from running targeted promotions on a deal platform: full-price customers’ fairness
concerns in post-promotional periods. The business press is unequivocal in its judgment about how
price fairness concerns of disgruntled customers may impact a firm’s bottom line. Most notably,
1

Dholakia (2011) reports that 80 % of users of a daily deal are new customers.
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AMAZON dropped its dynamic pricing strategy after some customers complained that they were
paying 3 to 5 percent more for the same set of DVDs than some other customers (Adamy, 2000). In
a report, Turow, Feldman, and Meltzer (2005) mention that 76% percent of American consumers
would be bothered if they find out another consumer paid less for the same product that they purchased. Numerous examples of consumers’ negative reactions to discriminatory coupon targeting
can be found on companies’ customer forums and social networks (BestBuy customer Forum,
2012; Techenclave, 2011). Similarly, academic research in Marketing has shown that ignoring
consumers’ price fairness concerns may lead firms to overestimate the profitability of targeted promotions (Feinberg, Krishna, and Zhang, 2002). In an experiment Feinberg, Krishna, and Zhang
(2002) find that loyal customers who pay the full-price perceive promotions targeted at switchers
as unfair and thus, their purchase intentions for the product or service during the promotional period decrease. Drawing upon the behaviorist approach of Feinberg, Krishna, and Zhang (2002)
to targeted promotions, we incorporate fairness concerns of consumers in an analytical model to
provide a new perspective for analyzing the profitability of running promotions on deal platforms.
Our model is able to address the following interesting research questions: What is the effect of
post-promotional price fairness concerns on a firm’s pricing strategy and profits running targeted
promotions on deal platforms? How does product or service quality impact the result? Furthermore, how does type of differentiation between firms influence the effect of price fairness concerns on firm profits? Finally, how does information leakage about the promotions to non-targeted
consumers in the promotional period affect firm strategies and profits in the presence of fairness
concerns? To answer these research questions we develop a 2 period game theoretic model where,
in the first period, firms target members of a deal platform with a promotional offer while charging a full price to all other customers. At the beginning of the second period all customers learn
about the prices charged during the promotional period and we assume that they take this information into consideration when making their next purchase decision. Specifically, we assume that
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non-targeted consumers who were not aware of the promotional offer and paid a full price perceive price unfairness and that their post-promotional valuation of the product will be impacted
negatively. Since this assumption is a key behavioral element in our model, we first conducted an
experiment to provide evidence that such an effect exists in a deal platform setting. Afterward, we
incorporate this behavioral assumption into our analytical model and analyze its impacts on firms’
profits. Thus, in the next section we describe the experiment and discuss its results followed by a
presentation of the model.

2.2

Literature Review

Our paper is related to the broad literature in marketing and psychology on consumers’ perceived
price fairness. A thorough review of antecedents and consequences of price fairness on consumer
behaviors can be found in Xia, Monroe and Cox (2004). Price fairness judgments involve a comparison that a consumer makes between the price she pays for a product and a reference price. The
reference price may be a price that another customer pays for the same product or the price that the
customer herself paid for the product earlier (Jin, He, and Zhang, 2013). In this research, we focus
on the former reference price since (as previous literature has shown) similar purchases made by
other customers have a greater effect on the perception of price unfairness than previous purchases
made by oneself. This is particularly true when this information is salient and when the other individuals in consideration are immediately relevant to the buyer (Xia, Monroe and Cox, 2004), or
when individuals perceive that they are powerful (Jin, He, and Zhang,, 2013). Consumers’ fairness
concerns arise when they realize the prices they paid are different from the prices other customers
paid. Literature has shown that customers may also suffer from ”advantageous price inequity” but
in the present research we just focus on perception of unfairness due to ”disadvantageous price inequity” since customers suffer more from inequity that is to their disadvantage than from inequity
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that is to their advantage (Xia, Monroe and Cox, 2004).
There is an extensive literature in Economics on fairness as well which focuses on how to incorporate customers’ observed reactions to unfairness in their utility functions. Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) model fairness as ”inequity aversion”. In their model, consumers dislike an unequal outcome whether the inequality is to their advantage or to their disadvantage. Ho and Su (2009)
also suggest that agents can have peer-induced fairness concerns when they engage in social comparison. Similar to previous research, we also incorporate fairness concerns in customers’ utility
functions. However, in our model we assume, consistent with our findings from the experiment,
that consumers perceive unfairness even in the post-promotional period when they realize they
experienced disadvantaged price inequity in the past.
Although there has been a quite number of behavioral studies on the consequences of price fairness
perceptions on consumer behaviors, there has been little academic research which specifically
considers the impacts of fairness perceptions on firms’ optimal pricing strategies and profits. Chen
and Cui (2013) provide an analytical model of price competition that incorporates consumers’
fairness concerns to explain why uniform pricing of branded variants can increase firms’ profits.
In their model, consumers’ fairness concerns make firms commit to uniform pricing rather than
non-uniform pricing. Feinberg, Krishna, and Zhang (2002) examine the issue of price fairness
in the context of targeted promotions. They demonstrate that when a firm in a competitive setting
offers a lower price to the switchers (i.e. potential customers) rather than to their loyals (i.e. current
customers), its profits go down with loyals’ perception of unfairness (”betrayal effect”). However,
while Feinberg, Krishna, and Zhang (2002) study the impact of fairness concerns on firm profits,
they do not analyze the optimal pricing strategies of firms when they implement promotions. In
recent working papers, Li and Jain (2014) and Lee and Fay (2014) extend Feinberg, Krishna, and
Zhang (2002) to study optimal competitive pricing for firms in a profit maximization framework
and study how firms’ profits and their behavior based pricing (BBP) strategies are impacted by
9

customers’ fairness concerns. Li and Jain (2014) find that competing firms which implement BBP
make more profit as consumers’ fairness concerns increase.
Although our research and the previously mentioned studies are similar to each other in terms of
studying the impacts of customers’ perceived price unfairness on firm profitability with an analytical model, in this paper, we analyze a scenario that differs from the ones studied above in several
ways. First, in the daily deal scenario price unfairness does not result from targeted pricing based
on past purchase behavior. In contrast, both Feinberg, Krishna, and Zhang (2002) and Li and Jain
(2014) study a scenario where firms offer promotions in the second period based on customers’ purchase behaviors in the first period. In these papers, in the second period, loyal customers react to
price discrimination which is applied in favor of switching customers. However, we analyze firms’
optimal pricing strategies in a 2-period model where firms offer promotions in the first period considering the impact of post-promotional fairness concerns on customers’ purchase intentions in the
second period. While we also consider the possibility that some non-targeted customers may learn
about the promotion when it is offered, we center our attention on the impact of post-promotional
fairness concerns of full-price customers. The reason is that although social media and the internet
may allow non-members to become aware of promotions quicker, anecdotal evidence suggests that
many still learn about them from other customers or other sources of information after the deal has
expired. As we explained earlier, through the laboratory study, we demonstrate that full-price customers perceive unfairness about a Groupon promotion that some other customers took advantage
of and that their post-promotional preferences for their first choice brand decrease in response to
price unfairness they perceived. Thus, our first contribution to the related literature is that we study
the dynamic impact of price unfairness on firms profits and strategies in a setting without BBP. We
thereby take into account the possibility of firms influencing the extent of unfairness that full-price
customers experience in the post-promotional period, and that firms compensate them for feelings
of unfairness by offering a price cut in that period. Furthermore, our model is consistent with
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the scenario of a firm running promotions on deal platforms to attract new customers. In contrast,
Feinberg, Krishna, and Zhang (2002) and Li and Jain (2014) assume that information about the targeted promotion is available to all customers in the promotional period and that the non-targeted
customers cannot obtain the promotion even if they are aware of it. As we pointed out earlier, we
also study how the type of differentiation between competing firms can change the direction and
degree of the effect of price unfairness on firms’ strategies and profits. Based on our knowledge
we are the first to address the issue of price fairness in a market where brands differ in quality. In
Chen and Cui (2013), competitive firms prefer to apply uniform pricing rather than discriminatory
pricing for their branded variants because uniform pricing mitigates price competition between
them.
In summary, we expand upon the aforementioned literature by specifically studying the impact
of full-price customers’ fairness concerns in the post-promotional period on differentiated firms’
profits and pricing strategies. This research problem has recently become important since businesses are desperate to find the most profitable marketing avenues, however, they are not aware
of the pitfalls when calculating their profits. Relatedly, academic research and business press has
highlighted the impact of bounded rational consumer behaviors like fairness concerns on firms’
strategies and profits (Forbes, 2014; Rabin, 1993; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Overall, past research
has often emphasized the adverse/negative effects of price unfairness on customers’ purchase intentions and eventually firms’ profits. However, in this paper, we find that under some conditions
firms can benefit from the perception of unfairness. More specifically, when two horizontally differentiated firms differ in quality, the high quality firm’s profit increases with fairness concerns as
long as the quality difference between the firms is not too great.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows: in the next section we introduce the modeling
framework followed by a discussion of our analysis. We begin by considering the case of a market
where firms are vertically differentiated and subsequently, we analyze the case of horizontally
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differentiated firms. We conclude the paper with a discussion of the results and limitations of the
research as well as suggest some future research avenues.

2.3

2.3.1

Model

Consumers

We consider a product category where two firms, denoted A and B respectively, compete for a
unit mass of consumers who have demand for one unit of the product in each of two periods. We
assume that the market consists of two consumer segments, promotional customers and full-price
customers, denoted with subscripts P and F , respectively. Promotional customers, who comprise
γ percent of the market, have signed up on a Daily Deal platform like Groupon and thus, can be
reached by the firms with a special promotional offer, R. The rest of the market, 1 − γ percent of
consumers, are full-price customers who are not members of the Daily Deal platform and who, in
the first period, are only aware of the regular price, P 2 . Furthermore, consumers in both segments
have a base value V for the product in each period. Thus, the utilities that promotional and fullprice customers receive from the purchase of product i in the first period are given by equations
2.1 and 2.2, respectively, with i = A, B.

UP i1 = V − Ri1
UF i1 = V − Pi1

(2.1)
(2.2)

We assume that in the second period pricing information from the first period becomes available
to all customers in the market. In particular, the full-price customers receive information about the
2

Later we relax this assumption and consider a situation where α percent of full-price customers become aware of
the deal due to the leakage of information during the promotional period.
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foregone deal and, consistent with our experimental results, they perceive unfairness. As a consequence, their valuation of the previously purchased brand is impacted negatively in the post promotional period. Following Ho and Su (2009), we assume that these customers of firm i (i = A, B)
experience a disutility b(Pi1 − Ri1 ) due to unfairness upon repurchasing product i. Alternatively,
they can switch to the competing firm j (j = A, B and j 6= i) and avoid the aforementioned utility
loss because they have not experienced unfairness by firm j 3 . In this formulation, the extent of unfairness perceptions is a multiplicative function of the difference between promotional and regular
prices in the first period, (Pi1 − Ri1 ), and consumers’ sensitivity to unfairness, b > 0 4 . There are
other possible unfairness effects that one could capture in a dynamic framework, for example, the
unfairness a consumer may experience when buying the product at the regular price after having
purchased it at the deal price. However, for parsimony we focus on the effect of customers’ fairness concerns about not receiving a deal on firms’ profits, without implying that other unfairness
effects are weaker or less predominant than this effect. In summary, the post-promotional utilities
UF ii for full-price customers who purchase from firm i twice, where i = A, B, and UF ij for fullprice customers who switch firms in the second period, where i, j = A, B with i 6= j,are given in
equations 2.3 and 2.4, respectively.
3

We could consider the possibility that full-price customers of a firm assess the pricing policy of the other firm
as well, e.g. in the second period full-price customers of firm A who switch to firm B experience a disutility of
b(PA1 − RB1 ) because they were not able to obtain firm B’s deal price in the first period. We do not study this
effect, since as Feinberg et al (2002) argue customers are more concerned about their favored firm’s mistreatment than
another firm’s mistreatment. More specifically, we assume the the effect of the other firm’s mistreatment to be zero.
4

Although the multiplicative function of the unfairness effect in the consumer’s utility function has been previously
suggested in the literature (Ho and Su, 2009), we tested the correctness of this formulation, conducting a laboratory
experiment (see Appendix for details). The results of the experiment strongly suggest that consumer’s switching
behavior due to unfairness are affected by the interaction of both their degree of sensitivity to unfairness and the
degree of price unfairness, (P1 − R1 ).
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UF ii = V − b(Pi1 − Ri1 ) − Pi2
UF ij = V − Pj2

(2.3)
(2.4)

Finally, as per assumption the firms d o n ot o ffer t he d aily d eal i n t he p ost p romotional period
and therefore, promotional customers who purchase product i in that period receive a utility of UP
i2 =

V − Pi2, where i = A, B. All notations used in this paper are summarized in Table 2.1.

2.3.2

Firms

There are two firms in the market, denoted A and B, which offer a product or a service at a
discounted price on a deal platform to attract promotional customers while serving the remaining
market at the regular price. We analyze the scenario where both firms offer a deal in order to
focus on the impact of customers’ fairness concerns on firm profits, although theoretically either
firm could refrain from offering a deal. In the Appendix we identify the parameter conditions
under which both firms run the daily deal promotion in equilibrium. We assume that both firms
have identical marginal costs which we set to zero without loss of generality. Furthermore, we
consider a two-period game where the deal is offered in the first period while in the second period
firms charge the same price to all customers. Although a firm could run several deals in sequence,
our set up is consistent with industry practice which shows that Daily Deal promotions are used
temporarily followed by non-promotional periods (GrouponWorks.com).

With the above-specified base model of consumer behavior, we analyze two cases of differentiation
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between firms A and B: (a) vertical differentiation, and (b) horizontal differentiation. For the latter
case we also consider the possibility that brands differ with respect to quality.

2.3.3

Vertical Differentiation Case

In this case we assume that brands A and B are differentiated with respect to a vertical attribute
and that all consumers prefer more of that attribute at equal prices (Tirole 1988, p. 296). One
vertical attribute that has been suggested in the literature is quality (Balachander and Stock, 2009).
Without loss of generality, we assume that firm A produces a higher quality product than firm B
and thus, we use notation H and L for firms A and B, respectively. The exogenous qualities of
the firms’ products are given by sH and sL , with sH > sL . Each consumer has a value θ for a
unit of quality which is distributed uniformly between θ and θ (θ > θ > 0). For simplicity, we
assume sL = 1 and sH = 1 + s where s denotes the quality difference between the brands. Thus,
the customers’ base values V for the products of firm H and firm L are equal to θ(1 + s) and θ,
respectively. Substituting θ(1+s) and θ in equations 2.1 and 2.2, we can find the marginal full-price
and promotional customers, θF L1 and θP L1 respectively, who are indifferent between purchasing
from H and L in the first period (see Figure 2.1-a). Next, we consider the demands for both firms
in the second period (see Figure 2.1-b). Firm H’s full-price customers who still repurchase from
H have θ > θF HH where θF HH can be found solving UF HH = UF HL (See Figure 2.1-b). The
remaining full-price customers who purchased from firm H in the first period switch to firm L in
the second period and are located between θF L1 and θF HH . Furthermore, the marginal full-price
customer who is indifferent between staying loyal to firm L and switching to H is located at θF LL
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which can be obtained by equating UF LH = UF LL . Consequently, firm H obtains a switching
segment of consumers who are located between θF LL and θF L1 . Moreover, in the second period,
platform members who paid the promotional price in the first period buy a product from the firm
that maximizes their utility, UP H2 = V − PH2 or UP L2 = V − PL2 .
We assume for simplicity that θ = 0 and θ = 1, and that the market is covered in both full-price
and promotional segments. Thus, given the demands developed above, the firms’ profit functions
for the vertical differentiation case are as follows:

πH = πH1 + πH2 = (1 − γ)(1 − θF L1 )PH1 + γ(1 − θP L1 )RH1 + (1 − γ)(1 − θF HH
+ θF L1 − θF LL )PH2 + γ(1 − θP L2 )PH2
πL = πL1 + πL2 = (1 − γ)(θF L1 )PL1 + γ(θP L1 )RL1 + (1 − γ)(θF LL + θF HH
− θF L1 )PL2 + γ(θP L2 )PL2

2.3.4

(2.5)
(2.6)

Horizontal Differentiation Case

In this case, we assume that brands are horizontally differentiated and we consider a Hotelling
framework (Hotelling, 1929), with two firms A and B located at the end points 0 and 1, respectively, of a line of unit length. Consumers’ ideal values with respect to a taste based attribute are
uniformly distributed along this line. More specifically, a consumer whose ideal point is located at
x and who purchases from firm A incurs a disutility of t ∗ x where t is a cost per unit of distance
between the consumer’s ideal value and the firm’s location. Thus, a customer who is located at x
has base values u − tx and u − t(1 − x) for products A and B, respectively, where u is a constant.
We substitute the base values for each firm for V in equations 2.1 and 2.2 to find firm A and B’s
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full-price and promotional customers’ demand in period 1, xF A1 and (1− xF A1 ) as well as xP A1
and (1 − xP A1 ), respectively. As shown in Figure 2.2-a, Firm A’s loyal full-price customers are
located between point 0 and xF AA and the rest of them switch to firm B: xF AB = xF A1 − xF AA .
Similarly, the loyal full-price customers of firm B are located between xF BB and 1 and the rest
switch to firm A: xF BA = xF BB − xF A1 . Furthermore, the members’ demand in each segment for
brands A and B in the second period are equal to xP A2 and 1 − xP A2 , respectively.
Given the demands for each segment in both periods, firms’ profit functions in horizontal differentiation case are:

πA = πA1 + πA2 = (1 − γ)xF A1 PA1 + γxP A1 RA1 + (1 − γ)(xF AA + xF BA )PA2
+ γxP A2 PA2
πB = πB1 + πB2 = (1 − γ)(1 − xF A1 )PB1 + γ(1 − xP A1 )RB1
+ (1 − γ)(1 − xF BB + xF AB )PB2 + γ(1 − xP A2 )PB2

(2.7)
(2.8)

For each of the cases we solve the game using backward induction, first, solving for the second
period prices and demands by maximizing the second period profits. Given optimal second period
prices and demands, forward looking firms maximize their total profits πi (i = A, B) with respect
to their first period full- and discounted prices, taking into consideration the impact of their pricing
strategy on full price customers’ perception of price unfairness in the second period. Substituting
both periods’ equilibrium prices and demands in the total profit functions, we find firms’ equilibrium profits which are depicted in tables 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4. In the next section we discuss our
comparative statics results for both models.
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2.4

2.4.1

Analysis

Vertical Differentiation Case

In this section, we first a n alyze t h e c a se w h ere t w o v e rtically d i fferentiated b r ands, H a n d L,
compete for the two segments across two periods. The derivations of the equilibrium are presented
in the Appendix and the equilibrium prices, demands, profits are summarized in Table 2.2.
The following proposition summarizes the main results of our investigation for this case.
Proposition 2.1. When firms are vertically differentiated and offer targeted promotions on a deal
platform, both firms’ profits decrease as customers’ sensitivity to unfairness, b, increases,

∂πi
∂b

<0

(i = H, L); however, the high quality firm’s profit is impacted less negatively by fairness concerns,
∂πH
∂b

>

∂πL
.
∂b

Proof: see Appendix.

Intuitively, as customers’ sensitivity to unfairness, b, increases firm H, which captures a larger
market share in period 1 due to its quality advantage, decreases its price in the second period, PH2 ,
to prevent resentful customers from switching to the competing firm. In turn, firm L increases
its second-period price, PL2 , to take advantage of the switching segment from firm H. Thus,
in the second period, an increase in b results in lower profits for firm H and higher profits for
firm L. On the other hand, because firms are forward looking they reduce the adverse effects
of unfairness on their second-period profits by decreasing the extent of discriminatory pricing in
the first period, Pi1 − Ri1 , with i = H, L. More specifically, we find that firms charge a lower
regular price and a higher discounted price in the first period. The rationale for this change in
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pricing is as follows. First, due to our assumption of market coverage the number of promotional
customers obtained in the first period does not have an effect on the firm’s ability to generate
profits in the post promotional period. Therefore, firms increase their promotional prices with
b. Second, they decrease their regular price in the first period to further reduce the extent of
unfairness that full-price customers experience in the second period, and to compete for the higher
margin segment. Consequently, both firms’ profits generated from their full-price customers shrink
while their profits from their promotional customers increase with b. However, due to its quality
advantage, firm H attracts more full-price customers by decreasing his regular price than firm
L since high quality products have higher demand elasticity to price decreases than low quality
products (Chen and Cui, 2013). Furthermore, firm H does not lose many promotional customers to
firm L by increasing his discounted price since high quality products have lower demand elasticity
to price increases than low quality products. Substituting fewer promotional customers with more
full-price customers in the equilibrium generates higher profits for firm H in the first period, since
at any level of b, the marginal profits gained by selling to a full-price customer exceeds the marginal
profits gained by selling to a promotional customer (Pi1 > Ri1 ). In summary, when b increases,
firm H loses less profit from increased competition for full-price customers and gains more profit
from reduced competition for promotional customers compared to firm L. Overall, for a given
quality difference, s, the high (low) quality firm’s profits increases (decreases) with b in the first
period and decreases (increases) with b in the second period.

When brands are vertically differentiated, although adjusting first-period prices enables the high
quality firm to increase his profits in that period, the profit increase cannot compensate for the loss
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incurred in the second period. The reason is as follows. In a vertical differentiated market, at equal
prices, the high quality firm can capture all consumers’ demand. Thus, the low quality provider
tends to charge a significantly lower price to obtain at least some of the demand. In turn, the high
quality firm will cut its prices as well leading to increased priced competition and lower prices of
both firms in equilibrium. An increase in b reduces the willingness to pay of full-price customers
for their preferred brand in period 2 and thus, incentivizes further price cuts by both firms causing
a decrease in total profits for firm H.

On the other side of the market, due to its quality disadvantage and already low prices, firm L’s
ability to decrease the extent of unfairness, PL1 −RL1 ,when b increases is small. Furthermore, firm
L is constrained in increasing his second-period price with b because the customers’ willingness to
pay for its product is lower than for the high quality product. Thus, as b increases, the low quality
firm cannot fully cover his loss due to perception of unfairness by decreasing the price difference
between his offers or increasing his second period price. In summary, at any quality difference
level, s, both firms H and L profits decrease with customers’ sensitivity to unfairness, while firm
H suffers less.

Next, we analyze another interesting case of brand differentiation in the real world which is Horizontal Differentiation. First, we assume that brands A and B have the same quality and consumers’
willingness to pay for both brands are equal. Later, we consider the case where one brand has a
quality advantage.
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2.4.2

2.4.2.1

Horizontal Differentiation Case

Products Do Not Differ in Quality

In this model, we consider two firms, denoted A and B, which produce horizontally differentiated
products. Furthermore, we assume that the customer’s reservation price for both firms’ products
are equal to u (see Model section) which is sufficiently h igh s o t hat t he m arket b etween t he two
firms is covered in both periods. We derive the Nash equilibrium in the Appendix and present the
equilibrium prices, demands, and profits in Table 2.35. The following proposition summarizes our
main result for this case.
Proposition 2.2. When firms are horizontally differentiated and offer targeted promotions on a
deal platform, customers’ sensitivity to unfairness b does not have any influence on firms’ equilibrium profits. Proof: See Appendix.

Similar to the vertical differentiation case, the forward looking firms adjust their prices in the first
period to reduce the negative impact of customers’ perception of unfairness in the second period.
As customers’ fairness concerns increase, the firms simultaneously increase their promotion prices
and decrease their full prices to diminish the extent of unfairness, b(Pi1 − Ri1 ), i ∈ {A, B}. However, in contrast to the previous case, an increase in the fairness sensitivity b surprisingly does not
affect profits of the horizontally differentiated firms. In both cases, the customers have the option
5

In this case, we set λ = 1/2 for the purpose of tractability and it is possible to show that the results regarding the
propositions do not change considering any λ 6= 1/2. Chen and Cui (2013) also consider equal sizes for the consumer
segments who purchase the two differently priced branded variants of the same firm and feel unfair when they buy a
higher priced one.
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to switch to the other firm in the market after they perceive they were treated unfairly; however,
in the horizontal differentiation case, due to symmetry of firms, the percentage of full-price customers who switch between the firms in the market are equal. Therefore, in equilibrium, given
our assumption of market coverage, the same percentage of resentful customers who refrain from
repurchasing from their preferred firm will be substituted by the switching resentful customers of
the other firm in the market. This explains why the horizontally differentiated firms’ equilibrium
profits do not change with customers’ sensitivity to unfairness in a market without product quality
difference.

Next, we examine the impact of customers’ sensitivity to unfairness on firms’ pricing strategies
and profits in a horizontally differentiated market when they also differ with respect to quality.

2.4.2.2

Products Differ in Quality

In this case, we assume, without loss of generality, that firm A offers a product of greater quality
than firm B. Therefore, we denote firms A and B as H and L, respectively. We assume that
the market is aware of the quality differentiation and thus, consumers’ base value V for the low
and high quality products are equal to u + QL − t(1 − x) and u + QH − tx, respectively, where
QH > QL . For simplicity, we consider QL = 0 and QH = Q > 0. We also assume that that higher
quality firm has the same marginal cost as the lower quality firm because we want to focus on the
demand side effects of quality differentiation. The rest of the assumptions remain the same as the
ones outlined in the Model section. Similar to prior analyses, we analyze the equilibrium in which
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both high and low quality firms decide to offer targeted promotions on the same deal p l atform. In
the Appendix, we derive the equilibrium conditions and all the equilibrium results are included in
Table 2. 4.
The equilibrium results reveal that the profits, prices and demands are greater for the high quality
brand than for the low quality brand in both periods. This result is similar to that obtained in the
vertical differentiation model. However, our main focus is on the comparative statics regarding
consumers’ fairness concerns. The following proposition relates the changes in the equilibrium
profits of both brands to changes in customer’s fairness concerns b and the quality difference between the brands, Q.
Proposition 2.3. Profits for two horizontally quality differentiated firms which offer targeted promotions on a daily deal platform do not change in the same direction as b increases. More specifically, as customer’s sensitivity to unfairness b increases,

(i) the low quality firm’s profit decreases at all ranges of quality difference (Q). However,

(ii) the high quality firm’s profit increases when Q is low enough, 0 < Q < Q

(iii) the high quality firm’s profit follows a U -shape function when Q is in an intermediate range
Q<Q<Q

(iv) the high quality firm’s profit decreases when Q is high enough. Q < Q. Proof: see Appendix.

The qualitative impact of b on pricing and profits of of firms H and L in each of the periods is
the same as for the vertical differentiation case and therefore, we do not replicate its rationale
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here. We recall that for a given quality difference, Q, the high (low) quality firm’s profits increases
(decreases) with b in the first period and decreases (increases) with b in the second period. However,
in contrast to the vertical differentiation case presented earlier, the interaction of the two focal
parameters, the customers’ sensitivity to unfairness b and the quality difference between the brands,
Q, affect the impact of b on total profits of the high quality firm in this case which we will detail
below.

In a horizontally differentiated market where firms differ in quality, the competition is less fierce
than in the vertically differentiated market since at equal prices, there are some customers located
close to L who prefer to purchase the low quality brand despite the quality advantage of firm H.
The locational advantage of firm L relative to some consumers lowers the level of competition in
the market and enables firm H to adjust its prices more freely than in the vertical differentiation
case. When the quality difference between the firms is large, firm H attracts a lot more full-price
customers in period 1 than firm L, thereby more of his customers perceive unfairness and tend to
switch to firm L in the second period than vice versa. The difference between promotional and
full prices and thus, the extent of unfairness is bigger for the high quality than for the low quality
firm’s customers, PH1 − RH1 > PL1 − RL1 . Furthermore, as the quality advantage of firm H
increases, the perception of unfairness for its customers increases. Thus, when Q is big, firm H
needs to decrease his second-period prices more aggressively with b, leading to a greater loss in
the second period. On the other hand, note that in the first period firm H captures a high share of
full-price customers at given levels of b due to its quality advantage. However, at higher levels of
Q more customers with weaker brand preferences for the high quality firm are drawn into his turf.
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Thus, when Q is big enough, firm H’s ability to gain a greater share of full-price customers and to
increase its profit in the first period and moreover, his ability to prevent resentful customers from
switching in the second period are small. Therefore, firm H cannot fully compensate for the loss
in the second period with profit gains in the first period as b increases.

As the quality difference between the competing firms decreases, firm H becomes more able to
increase his full-price customer demand by reducing his first period regular prices and this ability
increases with b since the rate of regular price reduction increases as b increases. Furthermore,
as explained before, firm H needs to reduce his second-period price to maintain his market share
but the rate of price reduction goes down with decrease in Q. At a given quality difference, as
customers’ sensitivity to unfairness increases, more customers with strong preference for brand H
decide to switch and these customers can be convinced to stay with a slight price reduction in period
2. Thus, when the quality difference Q is in the intermediate range, firm H’s profits in period 2 go
down at a diminishing rate and go up in period 1 at an increasing rate with b. Summing up the two
explained effects across different values of b, firm H’s profits follows a U -shape function with b
when the quality difference between the competing firms is intermediate.

Finally, when the quality advantage of firm H is low enough, firm H only needs to reduce his
second-period price relatively little with b, leading to smaller loss in the second period. Moreover,
firm H’s ability to expand his demand among full-price customers by regular price reduction increases as its quality advantage decreases. Thus, when Q is small enough, the loss in firm H profits
in period 2 due to increase in b is outweighed by its profit gain in period 1; hence, firm H profits
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increases as b increases.

The proposition above, interestingly, suggests that a high quality firm in a horizontally differentiated market can benefit from the increasing customers’ sensitivity to unfairness when its quality
advantage over the competing firm is low enough. Moreover, when the quality difference between
the firms is in the intermediate range, the high quality firm can benefit from consumers’ concern
about unfairness when customers’ sensitivity to unfairness is sufficiently high. On the other hand,
for a very high quality firm profits decrease with customers’ fairness concerns. Next, we explore
the impact of another factor that has been suggested to reduce the profitability of daily deal promotions, the possibility that information about the promotion leaks to full-price consumers who in
turn take advantage of the deal.

2.5

2.5.1

Model Extensions

Impact of Information Leakage

In this section, we consider an extension of the horizontal differentiation model in which the information about the deals becomes available to some full-price customers during the promotional
period6 . In the basic model outlined earlier, we assumed that there is no cannibalization effect
of full-price customers. In other words, in the previous models, none of the full-price customers
becomes aware of the targeted promotions in the first period. However, in many circumstances,
6
We also studied the impact of information leakage on firms’ profits in the vertically differentiated market and the
horizontally differentiated market with quality difference and reached the same conclusion as the ones presented in
proposition 2.4. The technical derivation of the results are available from the authors upon request.

26

when running promotions on a platform, due to reputation of the platform or leakage of information, a percentage of regular customers opportunistically use promotions for purchases they would
otherwise have made at full price (Gupta et al., 2012). Consider a firm which runs a targeted
promotion on Groupon. As Dholakia (2011) shows, on average close to 20% of customers who
buy the deals on Groupon are not new customers of the firms and thus they were not the target
of the firms’ promotion. In this section, we examine a horizontally differentiated market where α
percent of non-targeted customers learn about the deal and pay R1 rather than P1 . Therefore, due
to cannibalization effect of promotions, ((1 − γ)α + γ) percent of customers pay the promotional
price in the market and only (1 − γ)(1 − α) percent of the customers pay the regular price. The
main results of this case with leakage are summarized in the proposition below.
Proposition 2.4. In the horizontal differentiation case with information leakage to non-targeted
i
> 0). Proof: see Appendix.
customers, firms’ profits increase with information leakage, α, ( dπ
dα

The firms offer discounts on platforms to take advantage of the advertising effect of promotions
and to acquire new customers. However, if any non-targeted customer who is aware of the firm’s
product and is willing to pay the full-price, P1 , purchases at a discounted price, R1 , firms’ profits in
the first period decrease since R1 < P1 . On the other hand, as more customers become aware of the
promotion in the first period, fewer customers perceive unfairness in the second period. Thus, the
negative impact of unfairness on the firms’ second-period profits decreases with the cannibalization
effect. In other words, at a given level of customers’ fairness concerns (b), firms’ profits in the
second period increase with cannibalization of full-price customers (α). However, surprisingly we
find that increasing α softens price competition between the firms in the first period. The rationale
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is that as α increases, the size of full-price customer segment shrinks and thus, firms have a smaller
incentive to cut prices to obtain these customers. Consequently, at any level of fairness concerns,
a firm’s profits will increase with information leakage in the competitive case.

2.6

Summary and Conclusion

There is a broad recent literature which suggest that behavioral theory-based assumptions need
to be incorporated into quantitative models since neglecting such assumptions may lead to suboptimal pricing strategies and profits for firms (Amaldoss and Jain, 2005; Feinberg, Krishna, and
Zhang, 2002; Chen, Iyer, Pazgal, 2010; Ho and Su, 2009). In this paper, we add to this literature by studying the impact of consumer’s perception of price fairness on their post-promotional
purchase intentions and consequently on firm’s strategies and profits from running a targeted promotion on a deal platform. Intuitively, similar to previous research (Anderson and Simester, 2008;
Feinberg, Krishna, and Zhang, 2002), we expected that an increase in consumers’ perception of
unfairness leads to lower profits for a firm in the market since customers’ willingness to pay for the
discriminating firm will decrease. We observe such an effect for a vertically differentiated market.
This result implies that without considering the dynamic impact of price unfairness on consumers’
post-promotional purchase behaviors, the profitability of daily deal promotions is exaggerated for
firms which are vertically d ifferentiated. However, we find that this result may not hold for horizontally differentiated firms. More specifically, we surprisingly show that firms’ profits are not at
all impacted by customers’ fairness concerns in this scenario. The rationale for this finding is that
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for competing firms who are symmetric the negative effects caused by unfairness considerations
cancel each other. Moreover, our analysis of a horizontally market where competing brands differ
in quality lead to some additional counterintuitive results. In such a market, a high quality firm can
take advantage of an increase in consumers’ fairness concerns only when the quality difference
between the firms’ products is not too high. Contrary, our model suggests that when the quality
difference between the two horizontally differentiated firms is large, both high and low quality
firms’ profits decrease with consumers’ perception of unfairness. Furthermore, when the quality
difference between the two brands is in an intermediate range, the high quality firm’s profits first
decrease and then increase as customers’ fairness concerns increase. The main intuition behind this
finding is as follows. At any given level of quality difference, the high quality firm’s profits decrease in the second period with consumers’ sensitivity to unfairness, since he reduces his price to
discourage the resentful customers from switching. However, the high quality firm’s profits in the
first period increase with fairness concerns since as consumers’ fairness concerns increase, the high
quality firm reduces the extent of unfairness by shrinking the difference between his promotionaland full prices. Thus, as explained before, due to higher elasticity of demand to price-decreases
and lower elasticity of demand to price-increases compared to a low quality firm, a high quality
firm can attract more full-price customers in the first period and increase his profits. The overall
effect of fairness perception on high quality firm’s profits depends on the rate of increase and decrease of profits in each period which changes with quality difference between the brands. When
the quality difference between the firms is very big, the profit increase in the first period cannot
compensate for the profit decrease in the second period, because the high quality firm attracts a lot
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of low preference customers to its turf. Contrary, as the quality difference between the firms decreases, the high quality firm attracts more customers with higher brand preference for its product.
If these customers perceive unfairness in the second period and intend to switch, the high quality
firm can convince them to stay by reducing price only slightly. Therefore, when the difference in
quality between firms is small, the high quality firm’s profit increases in the first period can cover
his loss in the second period resulting in overall profit increase.

In an extension, we also find, interestingly, that information leakage about the promotion to fullprice customers has a positive effect on a firm’s profits in a competitive market. The competing
firms gain profits as the percentage of deals sold to their customers who would have bought at
full price in the absence of the deal, increases. The main rationale behind this finding is that
information leakage decreases competition between the firms in the competitive setting.

Our main results have some important managerial implications. First, firms should account for customer’s perception of fairness and its impacts on their profits when running promotions on daily
deal platforms. Moreover, we show that the effect of unfairness on firm’s profits change under
different conditions of competition, quality difference, and cannibalization of full-price customers.
Second, in cases when sensitivity to unfairness does have a negative impact on profits firms may
want to alleviate these concerns by explaining the reasons behind their targeted promotions and
revealing information about the dissimilarity between their full-price- and promotional customers’
transactions. Third, in a competitive setting, a slightly higher quality firm may not only want to
reveal the information about their targeted promotions but also may want to increase their cus-
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tomers’ fairness concerns. Fourth, in a competitive market firms do not lose profits as their regular
customers become aware of the promotions and pay the discounted price. Therefore, they do not
have to limit the redemption of their promotions by their non-targeted customers.
It is important to point out some of the limitations of this research. First, while we studied the
impact of fairness concerns when firms use the same platform for their daily deal promotions it
is important for future research to consider a competitive market where firms offer promotions on
competing platforms. In the current research, we study a situation where the competitive firms
offer promotional prices to the same pool of customers. This is consistent with a case where two
firms ( e.g. t wo S pas o r t wo R estaurants) r un p romotions o n t he s ame c ouponing p latform, e.g.
Groupon. However, there are some cases where two firms offer promotions on different platforms
(i.e. one firm on Groupon and one firm on LivingSocial). It will be interesting to analyze how
firms’ profits and strategies may change in this scenario.
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2.7

2.7.1

Appendix

Derivation of the Equilibrium for the Vertically Differentiated Market

We derive the customers’ demand functions in the first and second periods of purchase. Thus, we
have qH =

θ−θ
θ−θ

and qL =

θ−θ
θ−θ

where θ is the preference of a marginal consumer who is indifferent

between purchasing the high quality product or the low quality product (Tirole 1988, p. 296).
Equating θ = 0 and θ = 1 for simplicity, we have qH = 1 − θ and qL = θ. Thus, in the first period,
the full price and promotional customers who purchase from firm L have demands equal to θF L1
and θP L1 , respectively. Consequently, firm H’s full-price customers (γ percent of the market) and
promotional customers (1 − γ percent of the market) have demands equal to 1 − θF L1 and 1 − θP L1 ,
respectively.

UF H1 = UF L1
θ(1 + s) − PH1 = θ − PL1
PH1 − PL1
θF L1 =
s

UP H1 = UP L1
θ(1 + s) − RH1 = θ − RL1
RH1 − RL1
θP L1 =
s

(2.9)
(2.10)

(2.11)
(2.12)

In the second period, full-price customers who decide to stay loyal to firm H despite the perception
of unfairness have demand equal to 1 − θF HH .
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UF HH = UF HL
θ(1 + s) − b(PH1 − RH1 ) − PH2 = θ − PL2
b(PH1 − RH1 ) + PH2 − PL2
θF HH =
s

(2.13)
(2.14)

Similarly, full-price customers who decide to repurchase from firm L have demand equal to θF LL .

UF LL = UF LH
θ − b(PL1 − RL1 ) − PL2 = θ(1 + s) − PH2
PH2 − PL2 − b(PL1 − RL1 )
θF LL =
s

(2.15)
(2.16)

The rest of the full-price customers in the second period will either switch from firm L to firm H
and have a demand equal to θF L1 − θF LL or switch from firm H to firm L and have a demand
equal to θF HH − θF L1 . On the other hand, promotional customers do not perceive any unfairness,
therefore, their demand for the low quality firm (high quality firm) in the second period is equal to
θP L2 (1 − θP L2 ).

UP L2 = UP H2
θ − PL2 = θ(1 + s) − PH2
PH2 − PL2
θP L2 =
s

The profit functions of high and low quality firms in the second period are as follows:

πH2 = (1 − γ)(1 − θF HH + θF L1 − θF LL )PH2 + γ(1 − θP L2 )PH2
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(2.17)
(2.18)

πL2 = (1 − γ)(θF LL + θF HH − θF L1 )PL2 + γ(θP L2 )PL2

After substituting the customers’ demand functions into the profit functions above, we solve the
first order conditions to obtain the second-period demand and prices as a function of first period
prices.

b(1 − γ)(RH1 − RL1 ) − 2s + (1 − b)(1 − γ)(PH1 − PL1)
3(2 − γ)
b(1 − γ)(RL1 − RH1 ) − s + (1 − b)(1 − γ)(PL1 − PH1)
=
3(2 − γ)

PH2 =
PL2

It is easy to show that the second order conditions for a local maximizer are fulfilled forPH2
and PL2 , i.e.

∂ 2 πH2
∂ 2 πL2
=
= − 2(2−γ)
< 0. We plug PH2 and PL2 into the first period
s
∂p2H2
∂p2L2

profit functions of the firms. The forward looking firms, anticipating customers’ perception of
unfairness in the second period maximize their total profits with respect to the first period regular
and discounted prices, simultaneously.

πH = πH1 + πH2 = (1 − γ)(1 − θF L1 )PH1 + γ(1 − θP L1 )RH1 + πH2
πL = πL1 + πL2 = (1 − γ)(θF L1 )PL1 + γ(θP L1 )RL1 + πL2

We obtain equilibrium solutions for RH1, PH1, RL1, and PL1 as they are summarized in Table 2.2.
With tedious algebra we can also show that the second order conditions (
and

∂ 2 πi
∂ 2 πi
<
0;
< 0;
∂P 2i1
∂R2i1

∂ 2 πi
∂ 2 πi
∂ 2 πi
∂ 2 πi
∗
−
∗
> 0; i = H, L) are fulfilled only when 0 < b <
∂Ri1 ∂P i1 ∂Ri1 ∂P i1
∂P 2i1 ∂R2i1
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s
b∗1 = γ +

17γ − 7γ 2 + γ 3
). Substituting all prices and demands in the firms’ profit function,
1−γ

we obtain equilibrium profits for both firms as are also mentioned in Table2.2. We also check
for other equilibrium conditions. First we have to demonstrate that the promotional price is less
than the regular price for both firms in the first period. Considering the constraint from the second
∗
order conditions (0 < b < b∗1 ), we can easily show Pi1∗ − Ri1
> 0 only when 0 < b < γ. Now we

need to check whether the following conditions on demands are also fulfilled: 0 < θF∗ LL < θF∗ L1 <
θF∗ HH < 1, 0 < θP∗ L2 < 1, 0 < θP∗ L1 < 1, and 0 < θF∗ L1 < 1. We find that these inequalities are
fulfilled when 0 < b < γ.

Proof of Proposition 2.1:
∂Π∗H
∂b

=

8sγ(5−7γ+2γ 2 )(γ 2 (−160+83γ−4γ 2 )+6b2 γ(1+γ−2γ 2 )+b3 (−2−2γ+4γ 2 )+bγ(160−87γ+8γ 3 ))
9(4b2 (γ−1)+γ(50−23γ)+8b(1−γ)γ)3

< 0 and

−8sγ(5−7γ+2γ 2 )(2b3 (7−11γ+4γ 2 )−6b2 γ(7−11γ+4γ 2 )+γ 2 (310−302γ+73γ 2 )+bγ(−310+330γ−117γ 2 +16γ 3 ))
9(4b2 (γ−1)+γ(50−23γ)+8b(1−γ)γ)3

0 < b < γ. Moreover,

2.7.2

∂Π∗H
∂b

−

∂Π∗L
∂b

=

8sγ(γ−b)(1−γ)2 (5−2γ)
3(4b2 (γ−1)+γ(50−23γ)+8b(1−γ)γ)2

> 0;thus,

∂Π∗H
∂b

>

∂Π∗L
∂b

=

< 0 for all

∂Π∗L
.
∂b

Derivation of the Equilibrium for the Horizontally Differentiated Market

The derivation of the equilibrium for the horizontally differentiated market without quality difference follows the one of the model with quality difference presented later and is omitted here for
simplicity. Details are available from the authors upon request. The results of this special case are
summarized in the Table 2.3.
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Proof of Proposition 2.2: Π∗i =

17t
18

is not a function of b, hence firms’ equilibrium profits do

not change with increasing or decreasing customers’ fairness concerns.

2.7.3

Derivation of the Equilibrium for the Horizontal Differentiated Market with Quality
Difference

In this model, in contrast to the basic horizontally differentiation game, firms’ product differ in
quality and customers are willing to pay higher for the quality product. If a full-price customer
purchases from firm H in the first period, she obtains a utility of UF H1 = V + Q − tx − PH1
and if she purchases from firm L, she obtains a utility UF L1 = V − t(1 − x) − PL1 . The marginal
full-price customer can be found at xF H1 by solving UF H1 = UF L1 . The promotional customers in
the first period, decide whether to purchase from firm H and pay the deal price RH1 or purchase
from firm L and pay RL1 . The position of the marginal promotional customer is at xP H1 .
In the second period, resentful customers of high quality brand will either purchase from firm H
again and experience the unfairness disutility or switch to the low quality firm. The full-price
customers of high quality firm who stay loyal will have a demand xF HH which can be found
solving UF HH = V + Q − tx − b(PH1 − RH1 ) − PH2 = UF HL = V − t(1 − x) − PL2 . The rest of
the full-price customers decide not to purchase from firm H any more and switch to firm L. Their
demand is equal to, xF HL = xF H1 − xF HH .
Customers of the low quality firm maximize their utility by deciding whether to stay with the low
quality firm or switch to the high quality one. Demand of full-price customers of low quality
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firm with feelings of unfairness is equal to 1 − xF LL where xF LL is solved by equating UF LH =
V + Q − tx − PH2 and UF LL = V − t(1 − x) − b(PL1 − RL1 ) − PL2 . Consequently, there is
a switching segment to the high quality firm whose demand is equal to xF LH = xF LL − xF H1 .
Furthermore, promotional customers will have the demands, xP H2 and 1 − xP H2 for firm H and
firm L in the second period, respectively. xP H2 is solved by UP H2 = V + Q − tx − PH2 = UP L2 =
V − t(1 − x) − PL2 .
The firms’ profits functions in the second period are: πH2 = (1 − γ)(xF HH + xF LH )PH2 +
(γ)(xP H2 )PH2 and πL2 = (1 − γ)(1 − xF LL + xF HL )PL2 + (γ)(1 − xP H2 )PL2 . Similar to the
previous cases, solving the game through backward induction we first find the second period prices
and demands. Subsequently, we substitute them in the total firms’ profits across two period and
maximize the whole profits with respect to the discounted and regular prices in the first period.
The derivation of the equilibrium can be done in a similar way as the horizontally differentiation
case. We summarized the equilibrium prices, demands, and profits for both firms in Table 2.4.
In this section, we just show conditions that ensure existence of the equilibrium in vertically
differentiated case with the following properties: PH1 > RH1 > 0; PL1 > RL1 > 0; PH1
> PL1 > 0; PH2 > PL2 > 0; 1 > xP H1 , xP H2 > 0; and 1 > xF LL > xF H1 > xF HH > 0.
The second order conditions for Pi1 , Ri1 , and Pi2 , i = L, H to be maximizers are the same as
the second order conditions in horizontally differentiated case which lead us to the constraint:
0 < b < b∗1 = 12 (1 +

√

53).We start with PL1 − RL1 > 0 and PH1 − RH1 > 0 :
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4(1 − 2b)(−12Q + (77 + 8b(1 − b))t)
>0
9(77 + 8b(1 − b))
77 + 8b(1 − b) > 0 and (1 − 2b)(−12Q + (77 + 8b(1 − b))t) > 0
√
(77 + 8b(1 − b))t
1
1
(77 + 8b(1 − b))t
1
or < b < (1 + 53) and
<Q
0 < b < and 0 < Q <
2
12
2
2
12
Since 77 + 8b(1 − b) cannot be negative, PL1 − RL1 < 0
PL1 − RL1 =

4(1 − 2b)(12Q + (77 + 8b(1 − b))t)
>0
9(77 + 8b(1 − b))
77 + 8b(1 − b) > 0 and (1 − 2b)(12Q + (77 + 8b(1 − b))t) > 0
1
(77 + 8b(1 − b))t
0 < b < and 0 < Q <
2
12
PH1 − RH1 =

Therefore the conditions so far are: 0 < b <

1
2

and 0 < Q <

(77+8b(1−b))t
12

0

Now having the constraints above, we find the conditions under which RL1 and RH1 > 0 :

Q(−231 − 24b(3 − b)) + t(693 + b(380 − 8b(5 + 4b)))
>0
9(77 + 8b(1 − b))
77 + 8b(1 − b) > 0 and Q(−231 − 24b(3 − b)) + t(693 + b(380 − 8b(5 + 4b))) > 0
1
t(693 + b(380 − 8b(5 + 4b)))
0 < b < and 0 < Q <
2
231 + 24b(3 − b)
RL1 =

RH1 =
since

3Q(77+8b(3−b))+t(693+b(380−8b(5+4b)))
9(77+8b(1−b))

t(693+b(380−8b(5+4b)))
231+24b(3−b)

<

(77+8b(1−b))t
12

> 0 under conditions mentioned above and therefore,
for 0 < b <

conditions on first period prices are 0 < b <

1
2

1
,
2

the final constraints for equilibrium

and 0 < Q <

t(693+b(380−8b(5+4b)))
.
231+24b(3−b)

Moving to the

second period equilibrium conditions on prices and applying the constraints above we will have
the overall constraints for conditions on both period prices which are 0 < b <
38

1
2

and 0 < Q <

(77+8b(1−b))t
.
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Similarly, we can find the conditions under which the following requirements on both-period demands are fulfilled (1 > xP H1 , xP H2 > 0; and 1 > xF LL > xF H1 > xF LH > 0). Combining the
constraints for equilibrium conditions for demands with the ones for prices we will have the overall
equilibrium conditions which are as follows: 0 < b <

1
2

and 0 < Q < Q1 =

tb(154−b(292+16b(3−2b)))
.
63−24b(2−b)

Proof of Proposition 2.3:
−32Q(1 − 2b)(Q(1187 + 56b(1 − b)) + 3t(77 + 8b(1 − b))
1
∂Π∗L
=
< 0 for all 0 < b <
3
∂b
9t(77 + 8b(1 − b))
2

Now we have to find the sign for the term
0<b<

1
2

∂Π∗H
∂b

=

−32Q(1−2b)(Q(1187+56b(1−b))−3t(77+8b(1−b))
.
9t(77+8b(1−b))3

Since

, 0 < Q , and 0 < t, we have to just find the sign for 3t(77 + 8b(1 − b)) − Q(1187 +

56b(1 − b)).

3t(77 + 8b(1 − b)) − Q(1187 + 56b(1 − b)) > 0
3t(77 + 8b(1 − b))
if 0 < Q < Q2 =
1187 + 56b(1 − b)
3t(77 + 8b(1 − b)) − Q(1187 + 56b(1 − b)) < 0
3t(77 + 8b(1 − b))
if Q > Q2 =
1187 + 56b(1 − b)
Now we have to figure out the conditions under which Q1 > Q2 and vice versa.

(77 + 8b(1 − b))(189 − 2b(1259 − 2b(1177 + 28b(3 − 2b))))t
>0
(1187 + 56b(1 − b))(63 − 24b(2 − b))
=⇒ (189 − 2b(1259 − 2b(1177 + 28b(3 − 2b)))) > 0

Q2 − Q1 =
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1
2
(77 + 8b(1 − b))(189 − 2b(1259 − 2b(1177 + 28b(3 − 2b))))t
Q2 − Q1 =
<0
(1187 + 56b(1 − b))(63 − 24b(2 − b))
=⇒ (189 − 2b(1259 − 2b(1177 + 28b(3 − 2b)))) > 0
=⇒ .09 < b < .43
=⇒ 0 < b < .09 and .43 < b <

Thus:
∂Π∗H
1
> 0 when{0 < b < .09 and .43 < b < and 0 < Q < Q1 }
∂b
2
∂Π∗H
> 0 when{.09 < b < .43 and 0 < Q < Q2 }
∂b
∂Π∗H
< 0 when{.09 < b < .43 and Q2 < Q < Q1 }
∂b

Note that the sign for

∂Q1
∂b

When 0 < b < .09 =⇒

and

∂Q2
∂b

∂Q1
∂b

> 0 and when .43 < b <

change with different values of b. Q1 = F1 (b) and Q2 = F2 (b).
1
2

=⇒

∂Q1
∂b

< 0. Thus, Q1 (b = 0) = 0 ,

Q1 (b = .09) = .195t , Q1 (b = .43) = .197t , Q1 (b = .5) = 0.
When .09 < b < .43 =⇒
.43 =⇒

∂Q1
∂b

∂Q2
∂b

> 0 and when .09 < b < .27 =⇒

∂Q1
∂b

> 0 and when .27 < b <

< 0. Thus, Q2 (b = .09) = .195t , Q2 (b = .43) = .197t. Q1 (b = .09) = .195t ,

Q1 (b = .27) = .38t , Q1 (b = .43) = .197t.
Consequently,

∂Π∗H
< 0 for all F1−1 (Q1 ) < b < F1−1 (Q1 )
∂b
∂Π∗H
∂Π∗H
< 0 when F1−1 (Q1 ) < b < F2−1 (Q2 ) and
>0
If .195t < Q < .197t, then
∂b
∂b
when F2−1 (Q2 ) < b < F1−1 (Q1 )
∂Π∗H
If 0 < Q < .195t, then
> 0 when F1−1 (Q1 ) < b < F1−1 (Q1 )
∂b
If .197t < Q < .38t, then
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2.7.4

The Effect of Information Leakage

In this model, similar to the monopoly case with cannibalization effect 0 < α < 1 , the percentage
of promotional customers in the market increases to γ + (1 − γ)α and percentage of full-price
customers in the market decreases to (1−γ)(1−α). Solving the game through backward induction
similar to the basic horizontal differentiation case, we find the equilibrium profits of the firm i
(i = A, B) : πi∗ =

t(17−5α)
.
6(3−α)

∗
> 0
Checking all the following equilibrium conditions: Pi1∗ − Ri1

(i = A, B) , 0 < x∗F A1 < 1, 0 < x∗P A1 < 1, 0 < xF AA < xF A1 < xF BB < 1, and 0 < x∗P A2 < 1
lead us to the constraint 0 < b < b∗ =

Proof of Proposition 2.4:

∂Π∗i
∂α

=

1+α
.
2

t
3(3−α)2

> 0 for t > 0.

41

2.7.5

Detailed Description of the Experiments and Results

We conducted 2 laboratory experiments to show how customers fairness perceptions and eventually
their post-promotional purchase behaviors are impacted by the ”degree of discriminative pricing”
and ”customers’ sensitivity to unfairness (fairness concerns)”. Feinberg et al (2002) experimentally show that consumers when facing an unfair situation attempt to punish their favored firm by
switching to the competing firms. In their model, firms identify two segments loyals and switchers
in the second period based on the customers’ first period purchases. Then they decide which segment receives the promotion in the second period. Their experiment shows that loyals of one firm
observing that their favored firm offers promotions to the switchers feel unfair (betrayed) and tend
to switch to the competing firm in the market. We set up our experiments following Feinberg et al
(2002); however, we examine a duopoly market where the firms run targeted promotions in the first
period and they exclude a segment of the market (e.g. Groupon non-members) from receiving the
promotions. In our scenario, the excluded customers receive the information on promotions after
they made their full-price purchases and we show that their post-promotional purchase intentions
from the unfair firm will be impacted negatively.
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2.7.6

2.7.6.1

First Experiment

Design, Subjects, and Results

The primary goal of the first experiment is to establish evidence for the assumption that a consumer
would take past firm behavior into consideration when making their future purchase decisions.
157 students participated in the experiment. All the subjects were first given the same set of
information. They were asked to read the description of two music downloading firms (Table
2.5), choose to subscribe to one of them (Either GlobalAudio or DigiMusic, Not both) and split
100 points between the two. The information regarding the descriptions were collected from the
2014 Music Download comparison survey online. The descriptions were designed to be balanced
in order to make sure that the subjects’ preferences are not skewed toward one firm confirming the
fact the firms are not different in terms of quality. Moreover, the subscription fee for both service
providers was chosen to be $12/ Month which is also the average of the subscription fee for the ”to
go program” in the music subscription industry at the time of the experiment.

As a consequence of balancing the descriptions and fees, the percentage of subjects who chose
to subscribe to either firm in the first period was not significantly different from 50% (48.4%
chose DigiMusic and 51.6% chose GlobalAudio) and this ensures that subjects are indifferent
in purchasing either firm b ased o n t he d escriptions a bove. A fter s plitting t heir t otal 100-point
preferences between the two firms and choosing one firm to subscribe to for one month, the subjects
were told to imagine that one month has passed and that they had to renew their subscriptions
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and split their preferences one more time. At this stage before they make their second month
subscription decisions, we randomly assigned the subjects to 2 treatment and control groups. The
subjects in the treatment group (n = 79) received information about a Groupon promotion that had
been run during the first month by the firm they chose to subscribe to but they did not become aware
of the promotion and paid the full subscription fee. The subjects in the control group (n = 78) did
not receive such information about the Groupon promotion. In this experiment we test the
hypothesis below:
H1-a: Consumers who receive information about a firm’s promotion that they were excluded from
show lower preferences for the firm’s product in their future purchase occasions.
H1-b: However, ceteris paribus, consumers who do not receive any information about a firm’s
promotion that they were excluded from do not change their preferences for the firm’s product
in their next purchase occasions.

As we expected, the results of our experiment show that 38 out of 79 subjects in the treatment group
(48.1%) decided to switch providers since they found the situation to be unfair while only 9 out
of 78 subjects in the control group switched providers for the second renewal. More importantly,
an independent-sample-t-test shows that subjects in the treatment group showed lower preference
for their first chosen provider after experiencing the unfairness, i.e., 47.81 in the second month
compared with 60.54 in the first month (t = 5.22, p < .01). However, similar comparison in the
control group shows that subjects’ preferences do not change across the two periods of subscription
i.e. 64.28 in the second month compared with 62.83 in the first month (t = 0.62, p = .535 > .1)
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(See Figure 2.3).

Our results in this experiment confirm our assumption that consumers take feelings of price unfairness into consideration when making their future purchase decisions, even though the situation
where the unfairness occurred has already passed.

2.7.7

2.7.7.1

Second Experiment

Design and Subjects

The main goal of the second experiment is to replicate the findings o f e xperiment o f 1 a nd explore the extent to which the amount of discrimination and consumers’ sensitivity to unfairness
or discrimination may impact the consumers’ post-promotional preferences. This experiment was
conducted with 188 undergraduate students from a large southern university. The design of the
experiment was 2 (high/Low sensitivity to unfairness) × 2 (High/Low degree of discriminatory
pricing) between-subjects. The first purchase occasion procedure is exactly the same as the procedure in the first e xperiment. However, for the subscription renewal period, we randomly assigned
the subjects to 4 groups. The subjects in all groups are given information about the promotion
that had been going on but they were excluded from during the first p eriod. The subjects in each
group will either observe a high amount of the promotional discount that other customers received
or a low one. Furthermore, we emphasize that customers’ sensitivity to unfairness is not fixed and
as previous research has shown, it may change with different factors such as degree of similar-
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ity between the comparative transactions (Xia et al, 2002). For example, b decreases if full-price
customers realize that deal receivers had to spend some effort or incurred a cost (e.g. paying a
subscription fee for a couponing magazine) to become eligible for the promotion. Thus, the subjects’ sensitivity to fairness was also manipulated. For the low sensitivity case, we decreased the
similarity of transactions of the subjects and the customers who received the promotion by telling
the full-price subjects that the promotion receivers had to register on the firm’s customer forum,
create an account, wait to receive an email with a survey, and take the 20-minute survey to become
eligible for the discount. On the other hand, for priming the high sensitivity, we increased the similarity of customers’ transactions. The full-price subjects were told that the promotion receivers
had to only take a 5-minute survey to be eligible for the discount.
Four different groups of customers studied information regarding the promotion that they were
excluded from and they were asked to first express their emotions about this situation. We asked:
how do they feel about paying higher subscription fee than some other consumers paid in the
market? and how do they feel about being excluded by their chosen firm from receiving the
discount? Then the subjects were asked to choose a firm for their subscription renewal knowing
that the switching cost for them is negligible. 108 of the 188 subject pool decided to switch to the
competing firm since they found the situation to be unfair. We also performed a pretest with 56
subjects to check the manipulation of our independent variables. The students were asked some
questions regarding the descriptions, the amount of discount they missed, how similar they
perceive their transaction is to the person who received the promotion and etc. The results
indicated that the subjects understood the features of the scenarios.
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2.7.7.2

Model estimation and results

Since the dependent variable here was the switching behavior of the customers in the second period
and it is a binary variable, we ran a logistic regression with the following regression equation

SwitchingBehaviori = β0 + β1 Discounti + β2 Sensitivityi + β3 Discounti ∗ Sensitivityi

The β terms are all estimated coefficients of the independent variables and their interactions. Significance of β1and β2 can be interpreted as the significance of the main effects of Discount and
Sensitivity to fairness on subjects’ post-promotion behavior (whether they stay with their first period subscribed firm or they feel unfair and s witch). The laboratory experiment enabled us to rule
out other explanations for switching behavior of the subjects since not only the subscription fees
but also the description of the firms did not change and the subjects’ decision must have resulted
from their sensitivity to unfair situations and the amount of discount they were exuded from. The
significance of β3 shows that the interaction effect of both discount amount and sensitivity to
fairness might have affected subject’s decision to switch or not. The findings of the logistic
regression are reported in Table 2.6. Although the main effect of sensitivity to fairness is not
significant, the main effect of discount amount and the interaction effect are significant. The
conclusion of these results is as follows. The sensitivity coefficient did not reach a significant level
(P = .83 > .05), suggesting that subjects’ fairness concerns does not make them feel unfair unless
they face an unfair situation. Significance and positivity of interaction term coef-ficient (β3 = 1.38,
P = .04 < .05) proves the fact that unfairness sensitive subjects make their decision to punish
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the unfair firm by switching or not only when price comparisons are unfavorable to them and the
degree of the unfavorability (amount of discriminatory pricing) will also increase their intention
to switch. Figure 2.4 shows how the number of subjects who switched between the firms due to
unfairness is different across the 4 conditions. The result of the experiment strongly suggests
that consumer’s switching behavior due to unfairness are affected by the interaction of both
their degree of sensitivity to unfairness and they degree of price unfairness. Therefore, we
found an evidence that first, the consumers carry their grudge over time and they will punish the
firm even if the unfair situation is already passed and moreover, second, we could test the
correctness of the unfairness effect in the consumers’ utility functions.
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2.8

Tables

Table 2.1: Notation
Pik
Ri
b
V
γ
t
Q
s
θ
α
πik
πi

Firm i ∈ {A, B} or {L, H}’s full price in period k ∈ {1, 2}
Firm i ∈ {A, B}or {L, H}’s promotional price in the first period
Customer’s sensitivity to unfairness (fairness concerns)
Customers’ base value for each unit of product
Percentage of customers who are platform members and receive the promotions
Mismatching cost per unit of distance between a customer’s ideal product and a firm’s product
Quality difference between the products in horizontal differentiated market
Quality difference between the products in vertical differentiated market
Consumer’s value for a unit of quality in vertical differentiated market
Degree of cannibalization effect
Firm i ∈ {A, B} or {L, H}’s profit in period k ∈ {1, 2}
Firm i ∈ {A, B} or {L, H}’s total profit which is equal to πi1 + πi2
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Table 2.2: Equilibrium solutions for the Vertically Differentiated Market
First Period
∗
PL1
∗
RL1
∗
PH1
∗
RH1
θF∗ L1
θP∗ L1

s(4b3 (1−γ)+4b2 (γ 2 +2γ−3)+2bγ(5γ 2 −9γ−8)+γ(21γ 2 −110γ+140))
3(2−γ)(γ(50−23γ)+8b(1−γ)γ−4b2 (1−γ))
s(−4b3 (1−γ)2 −4b2 (1−γ)γ 2 +γ 2 (23γ 2 −96γ+100)+2bγ(5γ 3 −6γ 2 −19γ+20))
3(2−γ)γ(γ(50−23γ)+8b(1−γ)γ−4b2 (1−γ))
2s(−10b2 (1−γ)+2b3 (1−γ)+bγ(7γ 2 −12γ−10)+2γ(12γ 2 −56γ+65))
3(2−γ)(γ(50−23γ)+8b(1−γ)γ−4b2 (1−γ))
2s(−2b3 (1−γ)2 −4b2 (1−γ)γ 2 +γ 2 (23γ 2 −96γ+100)+bγ(7γ 3 −7γ 2 −30γ+30))
3(2−γ)γ(γ(50−23γ)+8b(1−γ)γ−4b2 (1−γ))
4b2 (1−γ)+3γ(9γ−20)+2bγ(1+2γ)
3(4b2 (1−γ)+γ(23γ−50)−8b(1−γ)γ)
4b2 (1−γ)+γ(23γ−50)+2b(2γ 2 +3γ−5)
3(4b2 (1−γ)+γ(23γ−50)−8b(1−γ)γ)

θF∗ LL
θF∗ HH
θP∗ L2
∗
PH2
∗
PL2

4b4 (1−γ)+12b3 (1−γ)γ+2bγ 2 (γ 2 +7γ−20)+9γ 2 (2γ 2 −9γ+10)+2b2 γ(3γ 2 −11γ+20)
3(2−γ)γ(γ(50−23γ)+8b(1−γ)γ−4b2 (1−γ))
4b4 (1−γ)−12b3 (1−γ)γ+2bγ 2 (γ 2 −16γ+30)−10b2 γ(γ 2 −4γ+6)+9γ 2 (2γ 2 −9γ+10)
3(2−γ)γ(γ(50−23γ)+8b(1−γ)γ−4b2 (1−γ))
3γ(2γ−5)
4b2 (1−γ)+γ(23γ−50)−8b(1−γ)γ)
12sbγ(b−γ)(2γ 2 −7γ+5)
(γ(23γ−53)−8b(1−γ)γ4b2 (1−γ))2
12sbγ(b−γ)(2γ 2 −7γ+5)
(γ(23γ−53)−8b(1−γ)γ4b2 (1−γ))2

∗
πH

s(4b4 (1−γ)2 (59−28γ)+16b3 (1−γ)2 γ(59−28γ)+8bγ 2 (−1480+2853γ−1687γ 2 +312γ 3 +2γ 4 ))
9(2−γ)(γ(50−23γ)+8b(1−γ)γ−4b2 (1−γ))
s(γ 2 (−37800+52480γ−24193γ 2 +3662γ 3 +19γ 4 )+4b2 γ(1480−3089γ+2271γ 2 −772γ 3 +110γ 4 ))
+
9(2−γ)(γ(50−23γ)+8b(1−γ)γ−4b2 (1−γ))
s(4b4 (1−γ)2 (11−4γ)+16b3 (1−γ)2 γ(11−4γ)+γ 2 (−9300+13420γ−7006γ 2 +1547γ 3 −119γ 4 ))
9(2−γ)(γ(50−23γ)+8b(1−γ)γ−4b2 (1−γ))
s(8bγ 2 (3100−588γ+349γ 2 −75γ 3 +4γ 4 )+4b2 γ(310−632γ+453γ 2 −151γ 3 +20γ 4 ))
+
9(2−γ)(γ(50−23γ)+8b(1−γ)γ−4b2 (1−γ))

Second Period

πL∗
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Table 2.3: Equilibrium solution for the Horizontal Differentiated market (Without Quality Difference)
∗
∗
PA1
, PB1
∗
∗
RA1
, RB1
∗
∗
xF A1 , xF B1
x∗P A1 , x∗P B1
∗
∗
πA1
, πB1
∗
∗
PA2
, PB2
x∗F AA , x∗F BB
x∗P A2 , x∗P B2
x∗F AB , x∗F BA
∗
∗
πA2
, πB2
πA∗ , πB∗

First Period

Second Period

(13−4b)t
9
(9+4b)t
9
1
2
1
2
11t
18

—

—
—
—
—
—
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—
—
2t
3
(9−4b(1−2b))t
18
1
2
2b(1−2b)
9
t
3
17t
18

Table 2.4: Equilibrium solution for the the Horizontal Differentiated market (With Quality Difference)
∗
PH1
∗
PL1
∗
RH1
∗
RL1
x∗F H1
x∗P H1
∗
πH1

∗
πL1

∗
PH2
∗
PL2

x∗F HH
x∗F LL
x∗F LH
x∗F HL
∗
πH2
∗
πL2
∗
πH

πL∗

First Period

Second Period

3Q(93−8b(1+b))+t(1001−b(204+8b(17−4b)))
9(77+8b(1−b))
−3Q(93−8b(1+b))+t(1001−b(204+8b(17−4b)))
9(77+8b(1−b))
3Q(77−8b(3+b))+t(693−b(380+8b(5−4b)))
9(77+8b(1−b))
Q(231−8b(9+b))+t(693−b(380+8b(5−4b)))
9(77+8b(1−b))
1 Q(45+8b(5−b))
+
2 6t(77+8b(1−b))
1 Q(77−8b(3+b))
+
2 6t(77+8b(1−b))
2
Q (5057+16b(1−b)(105+(1−b)b))
18t(77+8b(1−b))2
12Qt(77+b(1−b))(39+8(1−b)b)+11t2 (77+8b(1−b))2
+
18t(77+8b(1−b))2
Q2 (5057+16b(1−b)(105+(1−b)b))
18t(77+8b(1−b))2
−12Qt(77+b(1−b))(39+8(1−b)b)+11t2 (77+8b(1−b))2
+
18t(77+8b(1−b))2

—
—
—
—
—
—

—

2(36Q+(77+8b(1−b))t)
3(77+8b(1−b))
2(−36Q+(77+8b(1−b))t)
—
3(77+8b(1−b))
1 3Q(87+8b(1+b))−4bt(77−b(146+8b(3−2b)))
—
+
2
18t(77+8b(1−b))
1 −3Q(87+8b(1+b))−4bt(77−b(146+8b(3−2b)))
—
+
2
18t(77+8b(1−b))
+3Q(21−8b(2−b))+2bt(77−b(146+8b(3−2b)))
—
9t(77+8b(1−b))
−3Q(21−8b(2−b))+2bt(77−b(146+8b(3−2b)))
—
9t(77+8b(1−b))
(36Q+(77+8b(1−b)t)2
—
3t(77+8b(1−b))2
(36Q−(77+8b(1−b)t)2
—
3t(77+8b(1−b))2
Q2 (12833+b(1680−b(1616−128b(1+64b))))+12Qt(5775+b(1216−b(1152+b(128−64b))))+17t2 (77+8b(1−b))2
18t(77+8b(1−b))2
Q2 (12833+b(1680−b(1616−128b(1+64b))))−12Qt(5775+b(1216−b(1152+b(128−64b))))+17t2 (77+8b(1−b))2
18t(77+8b(1−b))2

—
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Table 2.5: Firms’ Description
Global Audio

DigiMusic

5 Million
Yes
30
10
10
192
Mp3, wma, aac
Partial-Length Preview
Yes

5 Million
Yes
30
7
5
192
Mp3, wma, aac
Full-Length Preview
Yes

7

10

Yes
Yes
No
Windows, iOS, Android

No
Yes
Yes
Windows, iOS, Android, Linux

Download Features
Music Titles available
24-hour/7-day availability
Maximum downloads in a month
Help/Support (Rate out of 10)
Maximum Simultaneous download
The quality that song is encoded
File types supported
Free Song Preview
Playlist/Organizer

Services and Capabilities
Search Capabilities rate in terms
of Genre, Artist, Song, and Album (out of 10)
Support customs ”Skins”
Online radio Stream
A digital locker to store music
Supported Configurations
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Table 2.6: Equilibrium solution for the the Horizontal Differentiated market (With Quality Difference)
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2.9

Figures

Figure 2.1: Vertically Differentiated Market in the Equilibrium
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Figure 2.2: Horizontally Differentiated Market with Quality Difference in Equilibrium
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Figure 2.3: Across Period Consumers’ Brand Preferences
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Figure 2.4: Interaction Effect Between Sensitivity and Amount of Discount
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CHAPTER 3: SIGNALLING QUALITY THROUGH AVAILABILITY IN
THE CONTEXT OF REPEAT PURCHASE

3.1

Introduction

Many manufacturers commonly apply scarcity strategies for their innovative products. For instance, Apple made its gold iPhone scarce during the product launch. In the first month of the gold
iPhone release, Apple’s flagship store in San Francisco had only 20 gold iPhones and even the
Verizon Store on Wall Street had none (Business Insider, 2013). Similarly, some service providers
deliberately place limitations on the quantity of service goods they make available to their potential customers. For example, unknown restaurants or spas which promote their services on
daily deal platforms such as Groupon and Livingsocial to attract new customers might offer only
a limited number of deals on the aforementioned platforms (Figure 3.1) (Groupon, 2015). Business press has documented that scarcity strategies can be effective for many product or service
categories (Business Insider, 2013; SeekingAlpha, 2015; TIMEBusiness, 2011; EntrepreneursJourney, 2015). Despite the benefits and successes of scarcity practices for some companies, yet,
many do not limit availability of their goods to the new customers but instead make them widely
accessible to any consumer who is willing to purchase. Product or service abundance can be observed among businesses which aggressively try to penetrate new markets with the availability
of deals on daily deal platforms (Figure 3.2) (Groupon, 2015). The above conflicting examples
(shortage vs. availability in Figure 3.1 vs. Figure 3.2) suggest the following research question:

59

why do some firms eschew service/product shortage in favor of availability and vice versa when
selling to new consumer markets?
In this paper, we offer a signaling model to answer this puzzling question. Many businesses operate in an asymmetric information environment in which new consumers have less information than
them about their quality of the products or services1 . The literature has shown that in such environments, firms can employ various marketing strategies like pricing, advertising, and warranties to
signal their quality to uninformed consumers (Bagwell and Riordan, 1991; Desai and Sirinivasan,
1995; Nelson, 1970, 1974; Milgrom and Roberts, 1986; Zhao, 2000; Moorthy and Sirinivasan,
1995). Bagwell and Riordan (1991) have examined the signaling role of pricing and they have
demonstrated that a high introductory price signals high quality because the consequent loss of
sales volume is higher for a low quality firm than for the high quality fi rm. In addition to pricing,
Nelson (1970, 1974) and Milgrom and Roberts (1986) have suggested that uninformative advertising may be a signal of high quality. Their basic idea is that advertising expenditure is a signal that
the high quality provider rather than low quality one is able to afford. However, Zhao (2000) constructed a model where advertising is not just considered as burning money to signal quality. He
showed that when advertising is informative or is used to raise awareness, a high quality firm signals quality by spending less on advertising than a low quality one. The rationale for this finding is
that decreasing sales results in a smaller loss in profits for the high quality firm than the low quality
firm. Apart from aforementioned signaling strategies, product or service scarcity has also received
a considerable attention in the Economics and Marketing literature (Becker, 1991; DeGraba, 1995;
1

The terms product and service are used interchangeably for the rest of the essay.
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Stock and Balachander, 2005, Parker and Lehmann, 2011). DeGraba (1995) concludes that excess
of demand is beneficial for firms because it induces a buying frenzy. In a buying frenzy, consumers
purchase the product before they become informed about their valuation because if they wait till
they are informed, the product is likely to be sold out. Stock and Balachander (2005) are the first to
address the signaling role of seller-induced scarcity. They assume there are two segments of customers in the market, innovators who are informed about the product quality and late buyers who
are uninformed. They show that signaling through scarcity can be more efficient than signaling
through price under some conditions. The key to their intuition is that scarcity only affects the uninformed customers or late buyers, while pricing affects all customers. Furthermore, a low-quality
seller who pretends to offer a high-quality product expects to make his sales from uninformed consumers alone and such a pretender is hurt more effectively by the scarcity strategy. Based on their
results, Stock and Balachander (2005) argue that scarcity strategies are useful for discretionary or
specialty products (non-convenience products). This is consistent with real business cases where
early product shortage are mostly observed for new one-time purchased goods such as Gold iPhone
(Business Insider, 2013), Samsung Galaxy S series phones (The Gaurdian, 2013), Microsoft Xbox
(CNN 2013), etc. Limited availability of aforementioned products made them more precious in
the eyes of their customers.

In the present paper, we extend the scarcity signaling literature by expanding the purchase context from durable products to repeatedly purchased products or services to answer the puzzling
question mentioned earlier. We use a two-period signaling model in which a monopoly provider
sells a repeatedly purchased good to uninformed new consumers. Consistent with prior research in
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psychology and marketing we assume that consumers desire exclusivity and make their purchase
decisions not only based on product attributes and price but also based on how many other consumers in the market could have access to the same product (Amaldos and Jain, 2005). In other
words, we assume consumers perceive an exclusive product to be more valuable (Leibenstein,
1950; Cialdini, 1987; Lynn, 1987). In the service industry, the consumers’ desire for exclusivity
can be interpreted as their desire for avoiding congestion or crowdedness which leads to poor service delivery (Mendelson and Whang 1990; Tereyagoglu and Veeraraghavan, 2012). Numerous
examples of consumers’ negative reactions to careless service delivery due to traffic and crowdedness can be found on companies’ customer forums and social networks (Harvard Business Review,
2012; Yelp, 2015). We show that, in such an asymmetric information market, somewhat consistent
with prior literature, the high quality seller signals its quality by making its product scarce as well
as charging a high price when consumers’ desire for exclusivity is high or cost of quality is great.
We also show that, even in the presence of exclusivity seeking consumers, there are conditions in
which product availability and introductory pricing is a more effective signaling strategy for the
high quality seller than product scarcity and high pricing. The intuition is that although making
the product available to more consumers in the introductory period negatively impacts the snobbish
consumers’ product valuation and consequently firm’s profits, consumers are able to infer that only
the high quality seller is able to compensate for the current loss in the future. That is because the
high quality seller attracts more repeat purchases than the low quality one and as more uninformed
consumers purchase the high quality brand in the first period, more informed consumers may
proceed to repurchase it in the second period. Furthermore, note that the high quality seller’s in-
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creasing availability makes mimicry less attractive for the low quality one, because its introductory
stage profits are reduced and he will not be able to cover this profit loss with future returns. Thus,
the low quality firm would prefer to make its product less available and price it higher, revealing
its actual quality. Our findings are consistent with the business observation that some high quality
service providers are more willing to make their product more available on daily deal websites by
providing deep discounts because the repeat customers are more valuable to them than to the low
quality providers. Not surprisingly, our findings on low introductory pricing are consistent with
the past signaling literature in the repeat purchase context (Nelson, 1970, 1974; Tirole, 1988) The
reasoning is that consumers observing the low introductory pricing infer that only the high quality
firm is able to forgo the current profits in exchange of future returns from repeat purchases. Moreover, low introductory pricing hurts the low quality firm since he is not able to sell his products in
the post-introductory period. In sum, this paper contributes to the signaling literature by showing
conditions under which availability supplements low introductory pricing as a signaling strategy
in a repeat purchase context even in the presence of snobbish consumers who seek exclusivity.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 3.2, we present our basic model of
asymmetric information about product quality. The analysis in section 3.3 proceeds by analyzing
the separating equilibrium and the implications for the model results. Concluding remarks and
limitation of this research are provided in section 3.4. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
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3.2

Model

We consider a two-period repeat purchase framework where one seller offers a new product of
uncertain quality. The exogenous quality, Q, of the seller’s product could be high, QH , or low,
QL , with QH > QL > 0. Without loss of generality, we assume that QL = 1 and QH = 1 + q
where q > 0. Each seller i (i = H, L) incurs a cost ci per unit production where cH > cL . In
this model, consistent with the signaling literature (Nelson, 1970, 1974; Milgrom and Roberts,
1986, Stock and Balachandar, 2005) we assume that the providers are aware of their product or
service quality; however, consumers are not till they purchase and consume it. In other words,
the seller offers an experience good. Characteristics of experience products are not evident on
inspection and the consumers can verify their quality only by purchasing and using them. In such
a market, low quality sellers have the incentive to represent their product as high quality thereby
increasing profits. Thus, while low quality sellers have an incentive to mislead consumers that they
are offering a high quality product, high quality sellers are willing to employ strategies giving up
profits to separate themselves from low quality sellers.

3.2.1

Consumers

In our model, there is a mass M of consumers who have a common value θ for a unit of quality.
Thus, we have a model where ceteris paribus, every consumer prefers a high quality product over a
low quality one because their values for the high and low quality products are equal to θ(1 + q) and
θ, respectively. In this model, consumers demand one unit of the product in each period and more64

over, they are sensitive to product availability, consistent with Amaldos and Jain (2005)’s notion
that some consumers are snobs and desire uniqueness. Thus, their value for a product decreases
as the number of people who buy the product increases. Furthermore, some research suggests that
congestion/crowdedness which results from the increasing number of product/service users has
also an adverse effect on the utility of consumers (Lippman and Stidham 1977; Mendelson and
Whang 1990; Tereyagoglu and Veeraraghavan, 2012). Following the aforementioned literature we
model the negative impact of percentage of product availability/stockout in a consumer’s utility.
We assume that consumers have a lower utility for consuming a product when they realize higher
percentage of potential consumers are able to consume the same product.
Particularly, when the firm of quality type i (i = H, L) announces the percentage αti ∈ (0, 1],
t = 1, 2 of buyers who can access and purchase the product in each period, consumers’ willingness to pay for the product goes down by ki αti where ki is the measure of consumers’ sensitivity
to availability of product type i (i = H, L). When a firm announces the availability α1 in the introductory period, consumers realize that only a fraction α1 of the whole mass market M will have
the opportunity to purchase the product (See Figure 3.3). Similarly, in the second period, the firm
decides on percentage of its product availability, α2 , and only serves a fraction α2 of consumers
who proceed to repurchase the product. In this model, consistent with the literature (Milgrom and
Roberts, 1986, Tirole, 1988) we assume that only those consumers who purchase in the introductory period (i.e α1 M ) proceed to repurchase in the post-introductory period (See Figure 3.3). Thus,
in our model, the number of people who purchase the product in the second period (α2 α1 M ) is
less than or equal to the number of people who purchase in the first period (α1 M ). In this case,
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based on Amaldos and Jain (2005), value of the product in consumers’ mind could be higher in the
second period than the first period. However, we argue that might not be the case since consumers
in our model are sensitive to the percentage of product availability to the potential market in the
current period. For instance, consumers of a spa or a restaurant do not care about the previous
periods’ crowdedness because it does not impact the current period service delivery.

Overall, consumers in our model derive utility from three different factors: the product quality, the
degree of product availability, and its price. Putting the three components of consumer’s utility
together, the per-period utility of a consumer from using a new product quality type i (i = H, L)
in period t (t = 1, 2) is given by Uti = θQi − kαti − Pti, where Pti is the product price in each
period.

3.2.2

Sequence of Events and Specification of the Game

In this model, the consumers and the firm move sequentially in each period. In the first period,
the firm which is aware of its quality decides on its price P1 and the percentage of its product
availability to consumers, α1 .Consumers observing P1 and α1 , create a belief 0 6 b = b(P1 , α1 ) 6
1 about the product quality i (i = H, L) and purchase the product only if their net utility U1i is nonnegative and the product is available to them. Normalizing M to be 1 without loss of generality,
the first-period profits function of a firm with quality type Qi , given the belief b about its quality
is π1i (Qi , ci , b, P1i , α1i ) = α1i (P1i − ci ). Note that this is a repeat purchase model and we assume
that between the two periods there is no communication among consumers; thus, in the second
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period, only consumers who purchase the experience good in the first period will be able to detect
its quality and proceed to repurchase it. Moreover, in the basic model, consistent with previous
research, we assume that consumers do not repurchase the low quality product in the second period
after they detect its quality in the first period (Tirole, 1988; Kirmani and Rao, 2000)2 .

Therefore, in the second period, only in the case of high quality product, those consumers who
purchased from the high quality firm in the first period will be willing to repurchase but only α2H
percent of them will be able to do so. Hence, the high quality firm’s profits function in the second
period is π2H (QH , 1, P2H , α2H ) = α1H α2H (P2H − cH ) while the low quality firm’s second period
profits is 0. In the next section first we analyze the full information case as a benchmark and then
proceed to solve for the separating equilibrium in the asymmetric information game.

3.3

3.3.1

Analysis

Full-Information Game

We consider a benchmark case where both consumers and the firm are aware of the product quality.
In such a market, consumers make their purchase decisions observing the firm’s product quality,
price, and availability. Note that in the full-information game, all consumers are informed about
the product quality in both periods. Thus, in the second period in a full-information market, all
2

One may argue that low quality firm is a monopolist which sells a convenience (repeatedly purchased) good
and the consumers have no option rather than purchasing a low quality product from a monopolist who has cheated
on them. Following this argument, we explored the alternative assumption that consumers purchase the low quality
product despite being aware of its quality and we found out that our qualitative results did not change.
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consumers are interested in purchasing the product, but only a limited number of them will be able
to do so due to availability of the product imposed by the firm. Without loss of generality, we
assume that high quality firm’s cost is equal to c > 0 and the cost for the low quality product is
equal to zero. Considering this assumption, we show that in the full-information case, the high
quality seller charges the price PHf =
θ(1+q)−c
2kH

=

earns a profit of
θ2
,
4kL

and makes its product available to a fraction αHf

of the consumers in both periods, while the low quality monopolist sets the price and

availability as PLf =

of

θ(1+q)+c
2

θ
2

and αLf =

(θ(1+q)−c)2
2kH

θ
.
2kL

Thus, the high quality firm which sells in both periods

and low quality firm which sells only in the first period earns a profits

respectively. It is trivial to show that 0 < αLf , αHf < 1 and 0 < PLf , PLf only when

consumers’ sensitivity to availability is high enough and cost of quality is low,
θ
2

θ(1+q)−c
2

< kH ,

< kL , and c < θ(1 + q).

Considering the conditions above, it is easy to show that
Proposition 3.1. In a full-information game, the high quality firm charges a higher price than the
low quality firm, PHf > PLf . Furthermore, when kH is low enough (kH < k H ), the high quality
firm makes its product more available than low quality one’s ,αHf > αLf , but when kH is high
(kH > k H ) he makes it scarcer, αHf < αLf ,where k H =

kL (θ(1+q)−c)
.
θ

Proof. See the Appendix

Section.

In the full-information game, all consumers are informed and their reservation price for a high
quality product is more than their reservation price for a low quality product. Thus, the high
quality seller prices its product higher to take advantage of consumers’ extra willingness to pay for
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quality. The high quality firm tends to use this leverage and makes its product available to more
consumers. However, it is limited in doing so in the presence of snobs who react negatively to
product abundance. Particularly, when consumers are highly sensitive to the high quality product’s
availability compared to the low quality one’s, the high quality firm’s incentive to make its product
abundant in the market decreases.

Next, we consider a case where all consumers are uninformed about the product quality and compare the firm’s strategies (pricing and availability) with the benchmark case where all consumers
are informed. As is standard in signaling models we use the concept of pure strategy perfect
Bayesian equilibrium to solve for the separating equilibrium under asymmetric information.

3.3.2

3.3.2.1

Incomplete Information Game

Separating Equilibrium

In this section, we investigate the firm’s pricing and availability strategies in a market where consumers are not aware of the firm’s product quality. In such a market, the low quality firm has an
incentive to signal high quality by providing the same availability and price as the high quality
firm. In this situation, the consumers are not able to infer the product’s quality from the signals.
To avoid this, the high quality seller sets his strategy pair in the first period (P1HI , α1HI ) in such a
way to not only maximize his total profits across two periods but also to not let the low quality firm
imitate his strategy. This equilibrium is a separating equilibrium where the low quality firm finds
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it optimal to reveal its true quality. Hence, the necessary mimicking constraint for the existence of
this equilibrium is as follows:

π(L, 0, P1Lf , α1Lf ) > π(L, 1, P1HI , α1HI )

(3.1)

The constraint above states that it is undesirable for the low quality firm to mimic the high quality
firm’s introductory strategies (P1HI , α1HI ). Recall that in the second period consumers realize the
seller’s low quality type and will not proceed to repurchase its product. Note that the mimicking
condition is binding. If it was non-binding, the high quality firm would increase his profits by
increasing the availability (price) of its product without changing its price (availability) meaning
0

0

0

0

that there exists a (P1HI , α1HI ) such that πH (P1HI , α1HI ) > πH (P1HI , α1HI ). Therefore, a separating equilibrium with a non-binding mimicking constraint would not fulfill the intuitive criterion
(Cho and Kreps, 1987). The parabolas in Figure 3.4 show the strategy pairs (P1HI , α1HI ) which
satisfy the binding mimicking constraint for different values of kH and c. Thus, the strategy pairs
(P1HI , α1HI ) that satisfy (3.1) are those outside or on the parabolas for the respective values of kH
and c.

Furthermore, for a unique equilibrium to exist, we have to make sure that the high quality firm
is not better off by deviating from the equilibrium by mimicking the low quality firm’s period 1
choice (P1Lf , α1Lf ), thereby suggesting low quality with certainty. If he does so, in the first period,
consumers believe that the firm is a low quality type. However, recall that after they consume the
product, they become aware of its quality. The deviation constraint below guarantees that the high
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quality firm does not find it profitable to deviate from the separating equilibrium.

π(H, 1, P1HI , α1HI ) > π(H, 0, P1Lf , α1Lf )

3.3.2.2

(3.2)

Equilibrium Results

3.3.2.2.1

Costless Signaling

In a costless separating equilibrium, the low quality firm will be worse off even if he mimics the
high quality firm’s full information strategies. Thus, the high quality firm is able to separate from
the low quality one by revealing its quality without incurring any cost. The proposition below
summarizes the costless separating equilibrium for the high quality firm.
Proposition 3.2. If kH > k H =

kL (θ2 (1+q)2 −c2 )
,
θ2

the high quality firm separates from the low quality

firm in the introductory period by applying its full-information strategy pair (P1Hf , α1Hf ). Proof.
See the Appendix Section

Recall that we assume that consumers show different sensitivities to high versus low quality products’ availabilities. Moreover, when the low quality firm mimics the high quality firm’s strategies,
uninformed consumers update their belief about their willingness to pay as well as their sensitivity
to product availability. Thus, when consumers are highly sensitive to the high quality product’s
availability compared to the low quality one’s, the low quality firm will lose too much profits by
mimicking the high quality firm’s strategies since he does not have access to the customers in the
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post-introductory period and he is willing to make its product more available in the introductory
period. Imitation, therefore, is not profitable for the low quality firm and the high quality firm is
able to separate without any cost.

3.3.2.2.2

Costly Signaling

When kH 6 k H , the high quality provider incurs a cost to make mimicking undesirable for the low
quality provider. Considering the constraints (3.1) and (3.2), we obtain a least-cost separating equilibrium for the high quality firm in which the low quality firm reveals his quality by implementing
∓
±
its complete information strategies (P1Lf , α1Lf ) and the high quality firm employs (P1HI
, α1HI
)3

as stated below. All proofs and derivations are deferred to the appendix.

∓
P1HI
±
α1HI

p
kL (kL (1 + q)2 − kH )
=
2k
p L
θ(kL (1 + q) ± kL (kL (1 + q)2 − kH )
=
2kL kH
θ(kL (1 + q) ∓

We summarize the costly separating equilibrium results in the propositions below. In the next
propositions we restrict ourselves to the more interesting case where the high quality firm makes
its product scarcer than the low quality firm in the full information game (kH > k H ).
Proposition 3.3. When k H < kH < k H , in the separating equilibrium, the low quality firm implements its full-information strategy pair (P1Lf , α1Lf ) but the high quality firm
3

+
−
−
Note that, the respective availability strategy for PHI
is αHI
, while the respective availability strategy for PHI
is

+
αHI
.
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(i) increases its product availability and lowers its price from their respective complete informa−
+
tion levels, i.e., P1HI
kH or when
< P1Hf and α1HI
> α1Hf , when 0 < c < c∗ and k H < kH < e
∗
c∗ < c < c∗∗ and k H < kH < kH
and

(ii) lowers its product availability and increases its price from their respective complete informa+
−
∗
tion levels, i.e., P1HI
> P1Hf and α1HI
< α1Hf , when c∗ < c < c∗∗ and kH
< kH < k H or when

c∗∗ < c and k H < kH < k H .
p
Where4 c∗ = 2(3kL + θ) − 2 3kL (3kL + 2θ), c∗∗ =

2θ2
,
4kL +θ

∗
and kH
=

(c−2θ)2
.
4c

Proof. See the

Appendix Section.

In the separating equilibrium, the consumers perceive that a product is a high quality one when they
+
−
−
+
observe either (P1HI
, α1HI
) or (P1HI
, α1HI
) and a low quality one when they observe (P1Lf , α1Lf ).

The proposition above states that the separating equilibrium for the high quality firm involves ei−
+
+
−
ther upward (downward) distortion (P1HI
, α1HI
) or downward (upward) distortion (P1HI
, α1HI
)

from its full information availability (price) depending on c and kH .The downward distortion of
the high quality product’s availability along with the upward distortion of its price is consistent
with the established findings (Balachander and Stock, 2005; Bagwell and Riordan, 1991; Parker
and Lehmann, 2011) that higher price and lower availability are associated with higher quality in
specialty product (one-time) purchase contexts. In proposition 3.3, we confirm that such relationship exists in a repeat purchase context only when c is high or when c is intermediate and kH is
high (Scarcity Region in Figure 3.5). In contrast to the aforementioned literature, when c is low or
c is intermediate and kH is low (Availability Region in Figure 3.5) we, interestingly, show that the
4

For simplicity, we considered q = 1.
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high quality firm not only does not find it profitable to apply scarcity and high pricing but that he
makes its product more abundant and prices it lower to signal its quality. The intuition for these
results is as follows.

In an asymmetric information market, consumers learn the quality of the product only if they purchase and consume the product, and as Nelson (1984) suggested, the high quality product’s repeat
sales increases only if its actual quality is revealed to more consumers. Thus, the high quality
firm has a greater incentive to attract more customers in the introductory period under asymmetric information than under full-information. This means that the high quality firm, in order to
take advantage of a larger customer base in the post-introductory period, tends to charge an introductory price below its full-information price and make its product available to more uninformed
customers. However, he is limited in doing so depending on customers’ sensitivity to availability
and marginal cost of producing quality. Although making the product more available in period
1 will generate a larger profit for the high quality firm in period 2, in the Scarcity Region, the
second-period extra profits is not enough to compensate for his large first-period loss due to the
high degree of customers’ sensitivity to availability (high kH ) and/or low price margins (high c).
Therefore, in order to make mimicking undesirable for the low quality firm in this region, the high
quality firm distorts from its full information strategies by making its product even scarcer and
pricing it even higher than their respective full-information levels. A high quality seller loses less
by making its product scarce in the introductory period because of his lower margin compared
to a mimicking low quality seller. Furthermore, the low quality seller, who does not sell in the
post-introductory period, would lose so much profits by mimicking the upward distorted price or
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downward distorted availability that he prefers to reveal his quality by implementing (P1Lf , α1Lf ).
Unlike in the Scarcity Region, in the Availability Region, by making its product available to more
uninformed consumers in period 1, the high quality firm is able to secure high demand and profits
in period 2 which is big enough to compensate for his small profit loss in the first period stemming
from the low degree of customers’ sensitivity to availability (low kH ) and/or high profits margin
(low c). Under these conditions, consistent with the notion of a a wasteful expenditure suggested
by Nelson (1970, 1974), the high quality firm is willing to forgo a fraction of his first-period profits
to signal its quality and earn higher future profits in return. However, a mimicking low quality firm
is not able to cover his introductory profit loss resulting from first-period low prices since he will
have no future sales.

It is worth mentioning that we assume that there is enough information for the consumers in the
market to interpret the pricing/availability signals of the firms. The consumers are aware of the
extent of future repeat sales for the high quality firm vs low quality firm in each of the availability
versus scarcity regions. In other words, they know there will be no future sales and returns for the
low quality provider after its quality is revealed and they know under what conditions, the high
quality firm is able to compensate for its first period loss. For example, in the scarcity region,
consumers make an assessment of both high and low quality firms’ losses and they realize only
the high quality firm can make its product that scarce and still make a profits. Moreover, in the
availability region, consumers know that both high and low quality monopolists lose demand and
incur a loss in the first period if they increase their availability, however only the high quality firm
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is able to compensate for their loss by their post-introductory repeat sales.

Next, we compare the strategies of the high quality firm and the low quality firm in the separating
equilibrium. It is trivial to check whether there is a parameter region in which the high quality firm
makes its product more available and prices it lower than the low quality firm in the separating
kH or when c∗ < c < c∗∗
equilibrium. We showed that in the region (0 < c < c∗ and k H < kH < e
∗
and k H < kH < kH
), the high quality firm makes its product more available than under full-

information. Thus, the relationship between the quality and scarcity is weakened in this region.
More specifically, we find that,
∗
,
Proposition 3.4. When 0 < c < c∗ and k H < kH < e
kH or when c∗ < c < c∗∗ and k H < kH < kH

in the separating equilibrium, the high quality firm makes its product more available and prices it
lower than the low quality firm (α1HI > α1Lf and P1HI < P1Lf ) while he makes its product scarcer
and prices it higher than the low quality firm under full information (α1Hf < α1Lf and P1Hf >
P1Lf ). Proof. See the Appendix Section.

As shown in proposition 3.1, under full information, when consumers are highly sensitive to product availability, the high quality provider implements a scarcity strategy in the introductory period
and does not sell as many products as the low quality firm. However, proposition 3.4 interestingly
shows that under asymmetric information, in order to signal its quality to uninformed customers,
the high quality seller applies the exact opposite strategy and makes its product more available than
the low quality firm. The results of this proposition stand in contrast to the results of the signaling
literature in case of durable goods that have shown scarcity and high price to be signals of prod76

uct quality. However, interestingly, we show that in a repeat purchase context, there is a negative
relationship between quality and scarcity or quality and high price. In the separating equilibrium
under some conditions, even in the presence of snobs, the high quality firm makes its product more
available rather than scarce (α1HI > α1Hf ) and prices it lower rather than higher (P1HI < P1Lf )
to signal its quality. Our results may in part explain the fact that local and unknown high quality
providers are more willing to offer high number of huge deals on daily deal platforms than low
quality ones to build a larger customer base (Zhao, Wang, and Gan, 2014).

Now we make some remarks on existence of the separating equilibrium in this model. The following proposition identifies the parameter ranges of kH and c which do not support a separating
equilibrium.
∗
,
kH < kH < kH
Proposition 3.5. When 0 < c < c∗∗∗ and e
kH < kH < k H or c∗∗∗ < c < c∗ and e

the high quality firm deviates from the separating equilibrium by applying P1HI = P1Lf and
α1HI = α1Lf .

As we showed in previous propositions, when the cost of high quality production is significantly
low, the high quality provider prefers to signal its quality by making its product more available
than the low quality provider. However, when consumers are extremely sensitive to high quality
product’s availability, increasing the degree of product availability is not a profitable strategy for
the high quality provider. Thus, when c is sufficiently low and kH is very high, neither making the
product more available nor making it less available than the low quality firm will be profitable for
the high quality firm, leading it to deviate.
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Summing up propositions 3.2 to 3.5, we could show different equilibria depending on parameters
kH and c in Figure 3.5. The intuitions of the aforementioned propositions help us to better understand the choice of signaling strategy by the high quality firm in different regions in Figure 3.5.
This figure shows that for a given level of cost of quality less than c ∗∗ , as customers’ sensitivity
to product availability decreases availability becomes a more efficient strategy than s carcity. Furthermore, for a given level of customers’ sensitivity to product’s availability less than k H , as cost
of quality decreases, availability becomes a more efficient strategy than scarcity. Moreover, in this
figure, we also observe that if customers’ sensitivity to product availability exceeds the threshold
k H , regardless of the cost of quality, the high quality firm is able to separate cheaply by applying
its full-information strategies.

3.4

Conclusion and Limitations

In this paper, we show that for a repeatedly purchased good or service, a high quality seller may
make its product more available and price it low to signal its quality to uninformed consumers
despite consumers’ desire for exclusivity. In our model, we consider a monopoly firm providing
a new repeatedly purchased good with two possible quality levels of high or low. We show that
in a separating equilibrium, to signal its quality, a high quality provider makes its product more
available and prices it lower than its respective full-information levels when cost of quality or
consumers’ desire for exclusivity are sufficiently small and he makes its product less available and
prices it higher than its respective full-information levels when cost of quality or consumers’ desire

78

for exclusivity are sufficiently high. In any of these situations, it is not effective for a low quality
provider who does not sell in the second period to mimic high quality firm’s strategies in the first
period since he is not able to compensate for his introductory profits loss in the post-introductory
period. Furthermore, we interestingly show that although the high quality firm might make its
product scarcer than the low quality firm under full information when customers’ sensitivity to
availability is high, he makes its product more available than the low quality firm under asymmetric
information. The basic intuition is that under asymmetric information, the high quality firm moves
opposite of what is profitable for the low quality firm. If the low quality firm represents himself
as a high quality provider, then consumers will have a higher sensitivity to his product availability,
thereby he is more interested in making its product scarce in the introductory period.

The existing literature on scarcity strategies predominantly describe positive effects for managers
that scarcity strategies lead to enhancement of value and perception of product quality. However,
results of this research provide implications and insights for managers that success of scarcity
strategy in signaling product quality depends on the frequency of product purchase (repeated vs.
one-time purchase product) as well as the cost of quality and customers’ levels of snobbishness.
Our analysis specifically provides conditions under which product availability rather than deliberate product stock-out could be used as a signal of quality for repeat purchase products. The results
of our paper could explain under what conditions of consumers’ desire for exclusivity and cost of
quality, new high quality providers should offer discounted or high prices and to how many consumers they should make their product available. The effect of kH suggests that the high quality
providers whose customers are extremely snobbish should not be worried about low quality service
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providers mimicking their strategies since it would not be profitable to do so. However, as customers’ level of sensitivity to product availability or the cost of quality decreases, availability along
with low pricing rather than scarcity along with high pricing becomes a more efficient signaling
strategy for high quality firms.

We assume in the analysis that customers show different sensitivities to high versus low quality
products’ availabilities. A laboratory experiment could be done to show support for this consumer
behavioral assumption. Furthermore, in our model, consistent with the literature in signaling we
assumed that the low quality service providers is not able to sell to any consumer in the second
period. Future research could relax this assumption and study a market where low quality firm
is still able to mimic the strategies of high quality firm in the post-introductory period to trick
remaining uninformed customers who did not purchase from him in the first period.

3.5

3.5.1

Appendix

Derivation of the Full-Information Market Equilibrium

In a full-information market consumers are aware of the product quality and they purchase a product type i (i = H, L) in period t (t = 1, 2) if and only if their net utility consuming the product in
each period is non-negative, i.e. Utif = θQi −ki αtif −Ptif > 0. Thus firms can charge a maximum
full-information price of Pif = θQi − ki αif in order to have αif fraction of the market purchase
the product in each period and earn profits πif = 2αif (Pif − ci ) across periods. Substituting Pif
80

into firms’ profits function and considering QL = 1, QH = 1 + q, cL = 0, and cH = c, we solve
the first order conditions to obtain the optimum full-information availabilities in both periods αHf
=

θ(1+q)−c
2kH

and αLf =

θ
2kL

for product type H and L, respectively. It is easy to show that the second

order condition for a local maximizer is fulfilled for both αHf and αLf i.e.

∂ 2 πif
= −4ki < 0 be2
∂αif

cause measure of consumers’ sensitivity to product availability (ki ) is positive. Plugging αHf and
αLf into the full-information prices and total profits functions, we obtain equilibrium solutions,
PHf =

θ(1+q)+c
,
2

πHf =

(θ(1+q)−c)2
2kH

for the high quality provider and PLf = 2θ , πLf =

θ2
2kL

for the

low quality one. We also check for equilibrium conditions 0 < PHf , PLf and 0 < αHf , αLf < 1.
With a tedious algebra and considering 0 < kH , kL , q, θ, we show that 0 < αHf =
only if

θ(1+q)−c
2

< kH and c < θ(1 + q), moreover, 0 < αLf =

Proof of Proposition 3.1:PHf − PLf =
kL (θ(1+q)−c)−θkH
2kH kL

θq+c
2

θ
2kL

< 1 only when

θ
2

θ(1+q)−c
2kH

<1

< kL .

> 0 for all q, θ > 0. The sign of αHf − αLf =

depends on the sign of the numerator kL (θ(1 + q) − c) − θkH . Thus, αLf < αHf

if kH < k H and αLf > αHf only if kH > k H where k H =

3.5.2

kL (θ(1+q)−c)
.
θ

Derivation of the Incomplete-Information Market Equilibrium

In an incomplete information market, consumers are not aware of the product quality. Thus,
the low quality firm has an incentive to mislead the consumers by mimicking the high quality
firm’s introductory strategies while the high quality firm chooses a price-availability combination
(P1HI , α1HI ) to not only maximize his total profits but also separate itself from the low quality
one in the introductory period. In the post-introductory period, the qualities are revealed to those
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consumers who purchased the product and high quality firm applies his full-information strategies
knowing the fact that consumers repurchase his product rather than the low quality product. Hence,
(P1HI , α1HI ) is the optimum separating solution for high quality firm in the first period if it solves
the following problem:

πHI =

max

06αHI 61, 0<PHI

α1HI (P1HI − c) + α1HI αHf (PHf − c)

s.t. αLf PLf > α1HI P1HI

(3.3)

(3.4)

where condition (3.4) is equivalent to the mimicking constraint (inequality (3.1)).

Proof of proposition 3.2: The maximum profits that the low quality seller can obtain by mimicking
happens when he imitates the high quality firm’s full-information strategies. Thus, maximum
πLI = αHf PHf =

θ2 (1+q)2 −c2
.
4kH

low quality firm, αLf PLf =

If this maximum profit does not exceed the revealing profits for the

θ2
,
4kL

then the low quality firm does not have any incentive to deviate

from his full-information strategies. Inequality αLf PLf − αHf PHf =

kL (c2 −θ2 (1+q)2 )+θ2 kH
4kL kH

satisfied only when kL (c2 − θ2 (1 + q)2 ) + θ2 kH > 0. Hence, when kH > k H =

> 0 is

kL (θ2 (1+q)2 −c2 )
,high
θ2

quality firm can charge his full-information strategies (PHf , αHf ) and separate without incurring
any cost.

When kH < k H , high quality seller needs to reveal its quality by solving (3.3). Plugging PHf ,
αHf , αLf , PLf , and P1HI = θ(1 + q) − kH α1HI into the problem, we can write the Lagrangian as
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L = α1HI (θ(1 + q) − kH α1HI − c +

(θ(1+q)−c)2
)
2kH

2

+ λ( 4kθ L − α1HI (θ(1 + q) − kH αHI )) where λ is

the Kunh-Tucker multiplier. Taking the partial derivatives with respect to α1HI and λ yield to the
following Kuhn-Tucker conditions:

θ2 (1+q)2 −8k2H α1HI (1−λ)+4kH θ(1+q)(1−λ)+c(c−2(2kH +θ(1+q)))
∂L
=
>
∂α1HI
4kH

(3.5)

0, α1HI > 0,

=0
and α1HI ∂α∂L
1HI

∂L
∂λ

=

4kL kH α21HI +θ(θ−4kL α1HI (1+q))
4kL

(3.6)

> 0, λ > 0, and λ ∂L
=0
∂λ

We break the rest of the proof into two cases.

Case 1: Inequality constraint is not binding. In this case, from condition (3.6) we have

∂L
∂λ

> 0

which implies that λ = 0. Substituting λ = 0 in (3.5) and considering a positive availability degree,
we can solve

∂L
∂α1HI

= 0 for α1HI as follows: α1HI =

(θ(1+q)−c)(θ(1+q)−4kH −c)
2
8kH

which is positive if

only if the expression in the numerator θ(1 + q) − 4kH − c is positive implying that kH <
which does not satisfy the condition

θ(1+q)−c
2

θ(1+q)−c
4

< kH for 0 < αHf < 1. Therefore, the results of case

1 are not acceptable.
Case 2: Inequality constraint is binding. In this case, from condition (3.5), we solve ∂α∂L
= 0 for
1HI
√
4k θ(k −k (1+q)2 )± kL (kL (1+q)2 −kH )((θ(1+q)−c)2 −4kH c)
in (3.5) and considering
λ. Substituting λ± = H H L
4kH (kH −kL (1+q)2 )θ
a positive availability degree, we can solve

∂L
∂α1HI

= 0 for α1HI as follows:
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√
±
α1HI

=

kL (kL (1+q)2 −kH ))
2kH kL

θ(kL (1+q)±

The corresponding price and profit are
√
∓
P1HI

√
θ(
±
πHI
=

=

θ(kL (1+q)∓

kL (kL (1+q)2 −kH ))
2kL

kL (kL (1+q)2 −kH )±kL (1+q))((kL θ(1+q)(2kH +θ(1+q))+ckL (c−2(2kH +θ(1+q))))−2kH θ
2
8k2H kL

The second order condition for maximum

±
∓
±
πHI
(QH , 1, P1HI
, α1HI
)

√

kL (kL (1+q)2 −kH ))

±
∂ 2 πHI
is satisfied:
±2 = −2kH <
∂α1HI

0.

It is trivial to show that this equilibrium is the only separating equilibrium which exists. Thus,
we have to make sure the high quality firm’s introductory strategies fulfill the following condition
0

0

0

0

±
∓
±
that there does not exist a (P1HI , α1HI ) such that πHI (P1HI , α1HI ) > πHI
(P1HI
, α1HI
). Therefore,
∓
±
to complete the rest of the equilibrium derivation, it suffices to show that (P1HI
, α1HI
) meet the

following conditions. The first conditions is the same as the deviation constraint (3.2) meaning
that high quality provider is better off by signaling his quality than by being perceived to be of low
quality.
±
∓
±
(P1HI
, α1HI
) > πHI (P1Lf , α1Lf )
πHI

For simplicity for the rest of the proofs we consider q = 1.

Proof of proposition 3.3:
−
+
First Solution (P1HI
, α1HI
) will be the equilibrium solution if and only if it satisfies the conditions

84

below

+
−
+
−
+
−
(i) πHI
(P1HI
, α1HI
) > πHI
(P1HI
, α1HI
)

+
−
+
and (ii) πHI
(P1HI
, α1HI
) > πHI (P1Lf , α1Lf )

√
(i)

θ

kL (4kL −kH )(c2 +4θ2 −4c(kH +θ))
2 k
4kH
L

> 0 ⇒ c2 + 4θ2 − 4c(kH + θ) > 0
and

(ii)

θ(2kL −kH +

√

kL (4kL −kH ))(c2 +4θ2 −4c(kH +θ))
2 k
8kH
L

∗
Considering both (i) and (ii) we have kH
=

c2 +4θ2 −4cθ
4c

>0

> kH and 2kL +

p

kL (4kL − kH ) > kH .

We break the rest of the proof into two parts: kH < e
kH = 3kL and kH > e
kH = 3kL .
∗
=
First case: If kH < e
kH , then condition (ii) will be kH < kH

sidering kH < k H =
√ 2
2
θ(

kL (4θ2 −c2 )
,
θ2

64kL +48kL θ+θ −(8kL+θ))
8kL

c2 +4θ2 −4cθ
4c

and kH < e
kH . Con-

∗
> k H ⇒ 0 < c < c∗∗∗ =
we will have two cases, (a) kH

∗
and (b) kH
< k H ⇒ c∗∗∗ < c < c∗ = 2((3kL + θ) −

p
3kL (kL + 2θ)).

∗
. Hence,
For the case (a), we have e
kH < k H . Similarly for the case (b), we also have e
kH < kH
∗
< kH .
when c < c∗ , the equilibrium condition is kH < e
kH . However, when c∗ < c, then kH
∗
Hence, when c∗ < c, the equilibrium condition is kH < kH
.

Second case: If e
kH < kH , then condition (ii) is ruled out since 2kL +

p
kL (4kL − kH ) < e
kH .

Consequently, the first strategy pair is the equilibrium solution so far only when c < c∗ and kH <
∗
e
kH or c∗ < c and kH < kH
. As we also noted in the main body of the paper, we focus on the

interesting case where k H < kH . When c < c∗ , we definitely know that k H < e
kH . However, when
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∗
c∗ < c, we have k H < kH
only when c < c∗∗ =

PHf −

−
P1HI

+
αHf − α1HI

2θ2
.
4kL +θ

Furthermore, it is easy to show that

p
kL (4kL − kH )
=
>0
2kL
p
ckL + θ kL (4kL − kH )
=−
<0
2kL kH
ckL + θ

+
−
Similarly, the second solution (P1HI
, α1HI
) will be the equilibrium solution if and only if it satisfies

the conditions below:

−
+
−
+
−
+
−
+
−
(i) πHI
(P1HI
, α1HI
) > πHI
(P1HI
, α1HI
) and (ii) πHI
(P1HI
, α1HI
) > πHI (P1Lf , α1Lf )
p
θ kL (4kL − kH )(c2 + 4θ2 − 4c(kH + θ))
< 0 ⇒ c2 + 4θ2 − 4c(kH + θ) < 0
(i)
2
4kH
kL

and
(ii)

θ(2kL − kH −

p
kL (4kL − kH ))(c2 + 4θ2 − 4c(kH + θ))
>0
2
8kH
kL

∗
ing kH < k H we have kH
< kH

c2 +4θ2 −4cθ
4c

p
< kH and 2kL − kL (4kL − kH ) < kH . Consider√ 2
θ( \ 64kL
+48kL θ+θ2 −(8kL+θ))
∗∗∗
if and only if c > c =
. Furthermore,
8kL

∗
Based on (i) and (ii) we have kH
=

∗
considering k H < kH , then k H < kH
only when c < c∗∗ .

Consequently, the second strategy pair is the equilibrium solution only when c∗∗∗ < c < c∗∗ and
∗
kH
< kH < k H or c∗∗ < c and k H < kH < k H . Under these conditions it is easy to show that

+
PHf − P1HI
=

ckL − θ

p
kL (4kL − kH )
<0
2kL
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αHf −

−
α1HI

=

−ckL + θ

p

kL (4kL − kH )
>0
2kL kH

Note that in previous equilibria for both strategy pairs, the high quality firm signals its product
quality via both product price and product availability. We are obligated to show that the high
quality seller would not be better off signaling through price alone or through availability alone.
When signaling through price (availability) alone, the high quality firm sets its product availability
(price) equal to its corresponding level under full information and sets its price (availability) in
a way to make mimicking unattractive for the low quality firm. Solving both aforementioned
equilibria similar to the basic model under asymmetric information, we find the following profits
(considering q = 1) for the high quality firm when signaling via price alone (πHIP ) and availability
alone (πHIA ), respectively.

πHIP =

2
+ 4kL θ) − 4ckL θ(2kH + 3θ) − c3 kL
2c2 kL (2kH + 3θ) + 2θ2 (kH
8k 2H kL
θ2 (c − 2θ)(c − 2(kH + θ))
πHIA =
8kH kL (c + 2θ)

+
+
−
−
With basic algebra we can show that πHI
> πHIP , πHI
> πHIA , πHI
> πHIP , and πHI
> πHIA

under their corresponding equilibrium conditions: c < c∗ and k H < e
kH or c∗ < c < c∗∗ and
∗
∗
k H < kH
for the first strategy pair and c∗∗∗ < c < c∗∗ and kH
< kH < k H or c∗∗ < c and

k H < kH < k H for the second strategy pair).
Proof of proposition 3.4: In the availability region, because k H < kH , under full information, the
high quality firm makes its product less available than the low quality firm while it makes it more
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available than the low quality firm under asymmetric information as you observe below.

PLf −

−
P1HI

+
αLf − α1HI

p

kL (4kL − kH ))
>0
2kL
p
θ(kH − 2kL − kL (4kL − kH ))
=
<0
2kL kH

=

θ(−kL +

Proof of proposition 3.5: There is a parameter region where neither availability nor scarcity in
separation is profitable for the high quality firm. Thus, he prefers to deviate from the separating
equilibrium.

−
+
+
−
πHI (P1HI
, α1HI
) < πHI (P1Lf , α1Lf ) and πHI (P1HI
, α1HI
) < πHI (P1Lf , α1Lf )
p
2
2
θ(2kL − kH ± kL (4kL − kH ))(c + 4θ − 4c(kH + θ))
<0
2
8kH
kL
p
either (i) 2kL − kH ± kL (4kL − kH ) > 0 and c2 + 4θ2 − 4c(kH + θ) < 0
p
or (ii)2kL − kH ± kL (4kL − kH ) < 0 and c2 + 4θ2 − 4c(kH + θ) > 0
p
c2 + 4θ2 − 4cθ
(i) kH < 2kL − kL (4kL − kH ) and
< kH
4c
p
c2 + 4θ2 − 4cθ
> kH
(ii) 2kL + kL (4kL − kH ) < kH and
4c

We break the rest of the proof into two parts: kH < e
kH = 3kL and kH > e
kH = 3kL .
∗
First case: If kH < 3kL , then condition (i) will be kH
=

is rulled out. We can show that considering kH < k H =

c2 +4θ2 −4cθ
4c
kL (4θ2 −c2 )
θ2

< kH < kL and condition (ii)

condition (i) is also ruled in this

case.
∗
Second case: If kH > 3kL , then condition (ii) will be e
kH < kH < kH
=
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c2 +4θ2 −4cθ
4c

and condition

2

2

∗
(i) is ruled out. Considering kH < k H , we will have two cases, (a) kH
> k H = kL (4θθ2 −c )
√ 2
2
2
θ( 64kL
+48kL θ+θ2 −(8kL+θ))
∗∗∗
∗
⇒ 0 < c < c
=
and (b) kH
< k H = kL (4θθ2 −c ) ⇒ c∗∗∗ < c <
8kL

c∗ = 2((3kL + θ) −

p

3kL (kL + 2θ)). In summary, no separating equilibrium conditions are (a)

∗
0 < c < c∗∗∗ and e
kH < kH < k H and c∗∗∗ < c < c∗ and e
kH < kH < kH
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3.6

Figures

Figure 3.1: Limitations Are Placed on Availability of Deals

90

Figure 3.2: No Limitations Are Placed on Availability of Deals
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Figure 3.3: Total Sales in Each Period
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Figure 3.4: Mimicking and Deviation Parabola
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Figure 3.5: Strategy Regions
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